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This thesis seeks to understand how right-wing and centrist populist parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe communicate with voters in order to gain electoral 
support, through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory. Previous studies into voter 
motivations for supporting right-of-centre populist parties have focused primarily 
upon economic, cultural or social factors. However, there has been limited research 
into the emotional appeal of populism to voters, and how it is expressed through 
party communication. In the course of this analysis the communications of six 
governing populist parties in the region during their most recent parliamentary 
election periods will be considered: ANO 2011 in the 2017 Czech legislative election, 
Fidesz in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election, GERB in the April 2021 
Bulgarian parliamentary election, PiS in the 2019 Polish parliamentary election, and 
the SDS in the 2018 Slovenian parliamentary election. The parties studied are 
assessed against the framework of Moral Foundations Theory based upon the news 
articles posted on their respective websites during the period in question, to develop 
an understanding of how they use emotive language to communicate with the 
electorate. 
 
Moral Foundations Theory was used to conduct this analysis due to its previous 
applicability to studies of political ideology and communication. The theory explains 
how individuals perceive morality through the use of five so-called “moral 
foundations”, which act as moral “taste receptors” (Haidt, 2012: 132) and guide 
reactions to certain notions and themes. The five foundations identified by Haidt 
(2012: 145-146) are care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation, with each playing a distinct role in 
shaping the moral palette of an individual. How individuals respond to suffering and 
to those in need is shaped by the care/harm foundation, while the fairness/cheating 
foundation indicates openness to working with others and instinctive responses to 
attempts by others to cheat (Haidt, 2012: 178). The loyalty/betrayal foundation 
considers the role of others working within a team and how trust is built within a 
group, whereas the authority/subversion foundation is concerned with the 
importance of social hierarchies and responsiveness to accepted norms (Haidt, 
2012: 178). Lastly, the sanctity/degradation foundation acts as what Haidt (2012: 
178) terms a “behavioural immune system”, which shapes how individuals react to 
certain symbols and objects (either encouraging engagement with them or triggering 
an aversion to them). The use of the five foundations as a framework of reference 
allows this study to understand how the parties analysed engage with voters’ 
conceptions of morality, and therefore creates the potential for an understanding of 
emotive appeals to national electorates by right-of-centre populist parties in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
As a starting point for enquiry, this thesis will begin by discussing the existing work 
regarding Moral Foundations Theory and ideology as well as how it translates to the 
context of the study. It will then assess prior criticisms of Moral Foundations Theory 
and discuss their relevance to this study, finding that while there is validity in the 
critiques made they are not applicable in this context due to the nature of the 
research being undertaken. Following on from the introduction to Moral Foundations 
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Theory it will then discuss definitions of populism, drawing upon existing literature 
and setting the framework for case selection. In the aforementioned section it will 
discuss the difficulties with defining populism as a “thin” ideology, and the impact that 
this will be expected to have on the findings of the research. As a next step it will 
then discuss the two populist typologies covered by the study - right-wing populism 
and centrist populism - and how they are determined, highlighting both their shared 
and unique characteristics. Existing literature offering explanations for why voters 
support populist parties, with a particular focus on arguments based around 
economic, cultural and social factors will then be discussed. As a final step in the 
background section it will use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey in combination 
with discussions of specific policy positions to create profiles of the six parties 
studied so as to inform the discussion about them contained within the analysis 
section. 
 
Having introduced the study and provided the necessary background information, 
this thesis will then move on to discuss the research methods used. This will include 
references to the research design (including the variables assessed) as well as the 
core hypotheses. It will consider the challenges surrounding operationalisation, as 
well as the limitations of the study and how they were overcome, particularly 
focusing on how accurate translation was ensured and data collection was 
standardised across the six case studies. Having covered the relevant background 
information and discussed the research methods used, it will then move into the 
analysis and findings. As a starting point it will assess the headline figures in terms 
of word use frequency on each of the five moral foundations, using two different 
Moral Foundations Dictionaries to ensure the most accurate results. It will then 
consider the same results in terms of the virtue and vice aspects of each foundation, 
to discern any deeper trends that could not be observed in the initial surface-level 
analysis. From there the thesis will move on to discuss the specific word usage by 
each of the parties studied through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory, assessing 
whether any outlier values can be explained by context as part of the process. 
Finally, it will discuss the common themes that emerge across the two party 
groupings studied (as well as for populist parties more generally) in terms of word 
usage on each foundation, before concluding with a restatement of the findings of 
the research, reconsideration of the original hypotheses and identification of potential 




Moral Foundations Theory  
 
Moral Foundations Theory and Ideology 
 
As a starting point for this enquiry into populism through the lens of Moral 
Foundations Theory (henceforth referred to interchangeably as MFT), it is worth 
considering the statement of Feldman (2013: 601) that “it is unfortunate that so little 
empirical research has focused on the psychological appeal of populism”. This is 
true not just of MFT, but of the field of political psychology more widely - 
explanations for support for populist parties and politicians have rarely focused upon 
psychology, and rather on socio-economic conditions. Therefore it is unsurprising 
that it is hard to ascertain from the existing literature how exactly one would expect 
populists to be classified by the foundations of the MFT scale. However, it is possible 
to develop underlying assumptions based on how MFT has been applied in different 
contexts to themes consistent with, or in opposition to, the populist right and centre-
right.  
 
Firstly, there are the general observations by Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) 
during their original development of MFT. They find that liberals (in the US context, 
the left in a European context) construct their perception of morality predominantly 
upon the care/harm and fairness/reciprocity foundations, whereas conservatives also 
rely upon the ingroup/loyalty, respect/authority, and purity/sanctity foundations 
(Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009: 1029). The former group of foundations become 
less important as you move rightwards across the political spectrum, whereas the 
opposite effect can be observed regarding the latter group (Graham, Haidt and 
Nosek, 2009: 1033). They also note that purity is particularly unimportant as a 
foundation for those to the left of centre, with fairness given a high degree of 
importance, and authority being given the greatest degree of importance by those to 
the right of centre (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009: 1036). 
 
There are also useful observations to be found in how different issue areas correlate 
with different MFT foundations. Those supporting big government (e.g. an 
interventionist state) tend to score highly on the care/harm and fairness/reciprocity 
foundations, while those supporting a strong stance on law and order score higher 
on the same foundations with the addition of respect/authority (Haidt and Graham, 
2009: 395). On so-called “culture war” issues the purity/sanctity foundation is the 
best predictor of attitudes, acting as a better indicator of views on topics regarding 
sexuality, relationships, marriage and the sanctity of life than self-described political 
orientation (Koleva et al., 2012: 186-188). Similarly, the purity/sanctity foundation 
tends to predict attitudes to opposition to illegal immigration, while the ingroup/loyalty 
foundation is a strong predictor of nationalistic views (Koleva et al., 2012: 189-190). 
Unsurprisingly, religiosity also correlates strongly with high scores on the 
purity/sanctity foundation (Miles, 2014: 85).  
 
It is however worth considering that the majority of the baseline work for the 
development of MFT took place in the context of the American political system, 
which is characterised by different issues and partisan divides to the political 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe (henceforth referred to as CEE). While there 
has been no previous research applying MFT to politics in the region, there are a 
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number of studies which have focused upon Western Europe, which are likely to be 
more relevant when contemplating the expected outcomes of the same type of 
research in CEE. In the case of Sweden, Nilsson and Erlandsson (2015: 30) found 
that care/harm and fairness/reciprocity were the most important foundations for all 
but the far right, although they declined in importance moving rightwards across the 
political spectrum, with the opposite effect true of the other three foundations - an 
almost identical trend as observed in the studies in the USA. 
 
In the UK, research was also conducted using MFT to understand the differences 
between Remain and Leave in the 2016 referendum on membership of the 
European Union, and between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party in the 
2017 general election. The former research found that Remainers scored higher on 
the care/harm and reciprocity/fairness foundations, while the respect/authority and 
purity/sanctity foundations were more important for Leavers (Prosser, 2019) - in 
effect, a repeat of the findings of the American research, with the Remain/Leave split 
mirroring the left/right split. Similarly, the research into the 2017 general election by 
Smith and Baroni (2017) showed the same pattern, although large differences could 
be discerned between the two parties on the fairness/reciprocity (higher for Labour), 
ingroup/loyalty and respect/authority foundations (higher for the Conservatives).  
 
Taken in sum, the previous research into MFT and political ideology as well as 
regarding MFT and specific issues makes it possible to come up with hypotheses 
about how the populist-right parties of CEE would expect to score on the respective 
foundations. However, it is worth considering that even within Europe there is a 
potential divide to be accounted for. Prior research has shown that the individualizing 
foundations (care/harm and fairness/reciprocity) tend to be given precedence in 
Western societies over the remaining binding foundations (Federico et al., 2013: 
591). With this in mind, one would expect this effect to be lessened somewhat in 
CEE, as the societies in question have undergone different historical processes to 
those of the West, for example the communist era standing in stark contrast to the 
democratic period of the same time in the majority of Western societies, and the later 
advent of nation-states in the region.  
 
Assessing Moral Foundations Theory 
 
A number of criticisms of Moral Foundations Theory have been advanced, mainly 
relating to the causal link between the foundations and ideology. One argument put 
forward suggests that Moral Foundations are related to context, and tied to ideology 
based upon cognitive processes, rather than being something innate and intuitively 
linked to ideology (Smith et al., 2016: 434-435). In effect, such an argument 
suggests that Moral Foundations Theory is useful only for understanding the 
consequences of ideology, rather than the causes - the importance ascribed to each 
foundation is dependent on ideological leanings, rather than determining them 
(Smith et al., 2016: 434-435). The same argument is advanced by Hatemi, Crabtree 
and Smith (2019: 803-804), describing the foundations as a series of moral 
reasonings motivated by political beliefs. 
 
Another challenge to Moral Foundations Theory comes from Suhler and Churchland 
(2011: 2111-2112), who question the innateness of the theory due to the lack of 
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evidence presented to ground it in neuroscience and biology, despite claims that it is 
rooted in evolution, psychology and development. In response to this critique, Haidt 
and Joseph (2011: 2119) argue that considering what is known about genetics, it 
would be unusual for there to be a biological link between moral intuitions and 
genetic traits. They also hone in on the concept they describe as “organization in 
advance of the editing” to describe innateness, suggesting that some things are 
innately known even if they are then shaped further at a later point by lived 
experience (Haidt and Joseph, 2011: 2120).  
 
The two critiques discussed above each have slightly different implications for the 
use of Moral Foundations Theory in the context of this study. The latter challenge put 
forward by Suhler and Churchland (2011) is more of a challenge to the theory as a 
whole, rather than any specific aspect. Yet a reasonably compelling counter to their 
argument is put forward by Haidt and Joseph (2011), which is enough to dissuade 
concerns about the general validity of the theory, and enough to make me 
comfortable in the use of it for this study. However, the challenge from Smith et al. 
(2016) is more relevant to the analysis being conducted here, as it discusses the use 
of Moral Foundations Theory during the assessment of political ideology. Yet 
regardless of whether the foundations determine ideology, or vice versa, one would 
expect the findings of this study to remain valid nonetheless. While it cannot be 
clearly determined whether supporters of right-wing populist parties care more about 
a specific foundation due to their ideological leanings or vice versa, it is still possible 
to assess how the parties communicate in terms of the foundations (and therefore 










As an object of study, there has been a great deal of discussion around populism 
and what the term itself should be understood to mean. For the purposes of this 
research, a definition has been adopted based on the existing literature on the topic, 
which allows for the classification of the six parties chosen as case studies as 
populist. This definition is based around an ideational approach to defining populism, 
rather than one based upon specific policies. Such an approach was chosen as the 
emphasis in this research is upon two specific types of populism (centrist populism 
and right-wing populism), and therefore the intent when defining populism is not to 
set out specific tenets of populist ideology expected to shape the findings of the 
research, but rather to provide a base to build upon. 
 
To begin, the definition originally offered by Mudde (2004) is used to set the general 
scope in which populist parties are defined. This holds that populism is “an ideology 
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues 
that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Mudde (2004: 544) also argues that “populism is 
moralistic rather than programmatic”, being based as an ideology around normative 
distinctions rather than programmatic ones - the core to this being the conflict 
between elites and the people. 
 
An updated version of this definition is adopted by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2017), which is also useful for setting the framework of this study. They extend 
Mudde’s original definition to classify populism as “a thin-centered ideology” (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 25) in addition to the previously listed characteristics. 
By this they understand populism as having no complex or comprehensive corpus of 
ideas or policies underpinning it, but instead being formed in combination with 
aspects of other ideologies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 25). In this they 
build upon the work of Stanley (2008) in defining populism as a “thin” ideology, in 
contrast to more comprehensive ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism or 
socialism. Stanley (2008: 102) otherwise premises the conceptual core of populism 
around similar characteristics to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser: “the existence of two 
homogeneous units of analysis: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’”; “the antagonistic 
relationship between the people and the elite”; “the idea of popular sovereignty” and 
“the positive valorisation of ‘the people’ and denigration of ‘the elite’.” 
 
While popular sovereignty is not explicitly mentioned by Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser as a core characteristic of populism, it can be understood as an example 
of the expression of the general will, and in this sense their definition and Stanley’s 
definition are much the same. A slightly different - although largely similar - definition 
is offered by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2007: 6-7), who offer four core principles of 
populism: “the people are one and are inherently ‘good’”; “the people are sovereign”; 
“the people’s culture and way of life are of paramount value” and “the leader and 
party/movement are one with the people”. Where their definition differs is in the focus 
upon the importance not just of the people as a unit of analysis, but also as 
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something explicitly separate from the general will, with both being core components 
of right-wing populism as will be discussed in the following section. However, for 
setting the general scope of the study this final definition offered by Albertazzi and 
McDonnell (2007) will be used, although the works of Stanley (2008) and Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) will be referred to when relevant in discussions of whether 
each of the case studies are truly populist.  
 
There is of course a weakness in the approach of defining populism as a “thin 
ideology”, yet also conducting a study which splits populist parties based upon 
ideological categorisation. Such an approach to the study suggests that these parties 
hold ideological interests, and that their policy-making is at least in part based upon 
ideological beliefs, and therefore calls into question whether it is fair to classify them 
based purely on a “thin ideology”, or whether they constitute distinct ideological units 
themselves. Indeed, scholars such as Aslanidis (2015: 89) suggest that the lack of 
ideological coherence within the populist party family prevents populism from 
constituting a fully fledged ideology, and that therefore it must be better understood 
as a discourse rather than an ideology.  
 
The aforementioned critique is a fair one, and one that is important to note before 
moving further with this study. By way of rebuttal, it is notable that Stanley (2008: 
108) explicitly states that populism is able to be a component part of a party’s 
ideological appeal to varying degrees, and that it can be understood as a bolt-on to a 
full ideology with varying degrees of salience over time. Therefore in the case of the 
two party groupings, what is on show is effectively two original ideologies (national 
conservatism and centrism) in combination with populism, rather than two distinct 
forms of populism (centrist populism and right-wing populism being terms of 
convenience, not clearly defined classifications).  
 
It is however potentially possible to discern a “thick” aspect of populism, as 
suggested by Neuner and Wratil (2020: 7-8), who see the “thin” aspects as the 
underlying ideas behind the political positions of a party, and the “thick” as specific 
populist approaches to policy. While there is merit in this approach, it should not 
change the definition offered for the scope of this study, as it is still the “thin” aspects 
which ultimately drive the “thick” policies in the explanation offered. However, it is 
worth noting for the analysis phase of the research, as it may help to explain 
unexpected patterns in the communications analysed, as one would expect that 
concrete policies are more likely to be mentioned than vague ideals, and therefore 
could reasonably be expected to result in higher scores on specific foundations.  
 
 
Populist Typologies: Right-wing and Centrist 
 
This study considers two different kinds of populist parties in power in CEE: right-
wing populists, and so-called centrist populists. In order to categorise the six parties 
used as case studies, it is necessary to firstly outline the nature of these two kinds of 
populism, starting with right-wing populism. As a starting point for defining right-wing 
populism, it is worth referring to the concept of the populist radical right advanced by 
Mudde (2007: 28) who distinguishes them from traditional conservative parties not 
just due to their populism, but also due to their nativism and lack of a neoliberal 
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socioeconomic agenda. While it can be debated as to whether PiS, Fidesz and the 
SDS fit the traditional categorisation of the “extreme right”, their policy positions do 
align with this definition, as will be covered in the section discussing the chosen case 
studies. 
 
Right-wing populism is characterised as being different from traditional right-wing 
ideology by seeking to appeal to those seen as being on the “losing side” of social 
processes, rather than protecting vested interests as conservatism does 
(Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 13). It adopts the people-centric character 
of populism in order to challenge existing political institutions and actors by claiming 
that they fail to adequately meet the needs of the people, and are therefore unfit for 
purpose (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 15-16). As well as mobilising anti-
system feeling, right-wing populism also seeks to create a sense of “identity crisis” 
within society, and agitates for a return to previous conditions - an aspect that is 
similar to traditional conservatism, although often with a far more nativist and 
exclusionary bent (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 17). It can also be 
assessed as a form of what Eatwell and Goodwin (2018: 48) refer to as national 
populism, described as “an ideology which prioritizes the culture and interests of the 
nation, and which promises to give a voice to people who feel that they have been 
neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and corrupt elites”. 
 
However, the populist right seeks to differentiate itself from the far right when 
mobilising nativist sentiments by talking in terms of ethnopluralism rather than being 
outwardly derogatory towards minority ethnic groups (Mudde, 2019a). It seeks in 
effect to create a form of ethnocracy, by discouraging immigration and encouraging 
repatriation, with non-native groups treated as a security threat as part of an 
authoritarian approach to the organisation of society - based also upon hierarchy, 
punishments for real or perceived deviancy and the imposition of “moral” or 
“traditional” education (Mudde, 2019a). For right-wing populists, the enemy is 
whoever is seen to be acting against the interests of the people, and by extension 
the nation, be they economic or political elites or even discrete groups (Mudde, 
2019a). Gender ideology is also seen as a threat, due to a belief that traditional 
gender roles should be reinforced and that any attempt to deviate from this is an 
attack on the traditional family, and therefore by extension the values of the nation 
(Mudde: 2019b). While the “them” and “us” divide can shift over time to focus on 
different groups, overall the political approach of the populist right remains the same, 
combining authoritarianism, anti-elitism, nativism and social conservatism (Mudde, 
2019a).  
 
It should be noted that while the so-called centrist populist parties covered adopt 
elements of right-wing populist discourse in their approaches, they can be classified 
into a separate distinct party family due their weaker attachment to specific 
ideologies. Instead of adopting the more radical rhetoric of the right, they instead 
combine populist approaches with more moderate positions, being conceptualised 
as “anti-establishment reform parties” (Hanley and Sikk, 2016: 522-523). Rather than 
taking up positions traditionally associated with the left or right of the political 
spectrum, centrist populist parties instead rely on technocratic approaches to 
government (Reiser and Hebenstreit, 2020: 575). In essence, their claim to rule on 
behalf of the people and to be conducting policies in accordance with the general will 
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is based upon holding relevant expertise, allowing for the bypassing of traditional 
political institutions and a lack of concern for ideology (Bustikova and Babos, 2020: 
497-498). This means that at times they may adopt the same stances as the 
populist-right, but that they do so purely out of political expediency rather than as 
part of a comprehensive ideological position or due to deep rooted convictions - for 
example, when responding to issues of immigration, gender or sexuality - in order to 
gain the maximum possible electoral benefit. 
 
Explaining Support for Populists 
 
The majority of work discussing determinants of support for right-wing populist 
parties has focused upon traditional explanations for voting behaviour. Oesch (2008: 
351-353) splits these explanations into three groups: economic explanations, based 
upon protectionism and fears of welfare competition; cultural explanations, such as 
fears of the impact of immigration on national culture and an exclusionary attitude 
towards citizenship; and alienation based explanations, such as protest voting and 
social disorganisation. Very similar explanations are also highlighted when 
discussing demand-side and supply-side factors driving support for the populist right. 
For the former, economic anxiety, rising inequality, reactions to immigration and 
cultural backlash are highlighted, while for the latter charismatic leadership and party 
positioning are considered key drivers (Mols and Jetten, 2020: 3-8). 
 
Economic factors are given primacy by a number of authors. Colantone and Stanig 
(2018: 217) find economic distress to be a driver of support for right-wing populism, 
with similar findings related to the effects of economic globalization identified by 
Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015: 35). This is built upon by Eichengreen (2019), who 
argues that economic concerns, particularly around socio-economic inequality, play 
a role in driving support for populism, but that there also remains a cultural 
component explaining voter motivations. This links into the cultural explanations put 
forward by other authors, as does the work of Margalit (2019) who argues that the 
economic impact on voter behaviour is modest and that it is instead an artefact of 
cultural explanations – for example economic insecurity being perceived due to 
cultural insecurity.  
 
Other authors put forward cultural explanations for support for populist parties. Using 
PiS as one of their case studies, Marchlewska et al. (2018: 159-160) find that 
collective narcissism and associated prejudicial behaviours play a role in driving 
support for populist parties, particularly when the notion of in-group disadvantage is 
advanced by parties and their leaders. Another perspective is advanced by Norris 
and Inglehart (2019), based around the concept they term “cultural backlash”. In their 
view, this takes the form of a multi-stage process, beginning with the shift from 
materialist to post-materialist values (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 32-35). At the same 
time as this shift in values, structural social changes took place due to higher levels 
of education, urbanization and ethnic diversity (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 35-42). 
According to their explanation, the combination of these factors not only reinforced 
support for progressive parties and causes, but also stoked a reaction from social 
conservatives resulting in the generation of support for authoritarian populism (Norris 




Political inefficacy - real or perceived - is also identified as a factor driving voters to 
support populist parties. Magni (2017: 101) finds that angry individuals motivated by 
perceived low levels of political efficacy are more likely to support populist or anti-
establishment parties, while support for sovereignist ideas (a core part of populism) 
tend to be predicted by the same factor, alongside partisan cues and conspiratorial 
thinking (Basile, Borri and Verzichelli, 2020: 249). Another factor identified which 
strongly predicts support for populist parties is self-perceived “economic, cultural and 
political vulnerability” (Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenboeck, 2016: 344) which 
ties into the explanations put forth by Oesch (2008) and Mols and Jetten (2020). 
However, there are few explanations offered which consider support for populism to 
be an emotional reflex, beyond the work of Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza (2017: 455) 
suggesting it is motivated in part by anger. Therefore while there are aspects of the 
ingroup/loyalty and fairness/reciprocity that can be seen in parts of the explanations, 





Party Positions and Policies 
 
In order to get a feel for the respective positions of the six parties chosen as case 
studies on the political spectrum, it is worth consulting the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(Bakker et al., 2020). The most recent version of the survey was conducted in 2019, 
tracking parties’ positions on European integration and ideology, as well as on a 
number of policy dimensions and with regard to a series of party characteristics, 
using information provided by experts. As the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (henceforth 
referred to interchangeably as the CHES) has been running since 1999 and the 2019 
survey represents the sixth iteration (Chesdata, 2021) with previous editions 
successfully cross-validated against other sources (Polk et al., 2017: 3), and 
therefore a degree of confidence can be established regarding the validity of using it 
to ascertain an overview of the positions of the parties studied. While it is by no 
means a perfect measure due to being based on subjective, rather than objective, 
criteria, for the purposes of this research it serves as a useful barometer with which 
to identify expected trends when discussing the differing language used by each 
party to communicate with the public through the prism of Moral Foundations Theory. 
However, it is worth noting those limitations, and considering cases where party 
positioning according to the CHES does not appear to match their policy platforms - 
as is discussed in this section in the case of Fidesz. 
 
Views on European integration could be suggested to be a good proxy for the 
likelihood of a high score on the loyalty/ingroup foundation, due to the tendency for 
Euroscepticism to be tied to nationalism, itself a strong expression of preference for 
the ingroup. To an extent, the positions of the parties according to the CHES map 
across the centrist/right-wing divide between the populist parties studied: GERB and 
OL’aNO view European integration more favourably, and PiS and Fidesz less 
favourably. However, the SDS take a more positive view than ANO 2011, although 
the main aspect of European integration opposed by the Slovenian party is that of 
asylum policy, which ties into the expected preference for the loyalty/ingroup 
foundation expected on the right.  
 
Yet it is worth noting that overall, only GERB (on the pro-integration side of the 
ledger), Fidesz and PiS (both on the anti-integration side) hold views strongly 
different from the mainstream in their respective countries. It is true that ANO 2011 
looks more favourably than the average Czech party on the economic aspects of 
integration (suggesting a more laissez-faire economic approach) and the SDS is an 
outlier in Slovenia regarding asylum policy (showing a disdain for that facet of 
integration comparable to the extreme right SNS), but overall it seems that attitudes 
to European integration within the group of case studies are less aligned than would 
be expected. Instead, it is worth considering ideological leanings in more detail to 
identify potential trends in the MFT analysis. 
 
When ideological positioning is considered, a clear alignment can be seen with the 
previously described distinction between the centrist and right-wing populists. Fidesz 
and the SDS occupy a space on the ideological spectrum between right-wing and 
far-right, with PiS comfortably right-wing. GERB and OL’aNO are best described as 
centre-right, with ANO 2011 more of a truly centrist party. However, when economic 
ideology is considered a very different picture appears. While the centrist populists 
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have a consistent approach both in political and economic terms ideologically, only 
the SDS remains on the right economically of the right-wing populists. Fidesz is 
considered to be centre-left economically, with PiS more traditionally left-wing in 
economic terms.  
 
This distinction would be expected to be replicated when assessing party 
communications against the MFT matrix. If previous patterns hold true, PiS and 
Fidesz would be expected to score higher on the care/harm and 
fairness/proportionality foundations due to holding more traditionally left-wing 
stances on the economy, whereas the SDS would be expected to look like a more 
extreme variant of a conservative party in MFT terms. However, if the MFT 
foundations are impacted predominantly by social and cultural values rather than 
economic values, one would expect the traditional left-right divide to emerge, as 
Fidesz, PiS and SDS are all strongly traditionalist and authoritarian, as well as 
ascribing greater salience to such issues than the three centrist populist parties.  
 
Even when accounting for the ideological centre ground in each of the respective 
states studied, the patterns identified above remain. GERB, ANO 2011 and OL’aNO 
all occupy the centre ground in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
respectively, while Fidesz, PiS and SDS occupy the most rightward spaces in their 
respective party systems with the exception of extreme-right parties (Mi Hazank 
were not included for Hungary, but Konfederacja and the SNS occupy the same 
spaces in Poland and Slovenia respectively). Yet the divergence between economic 
values and social and cultural values remains for Fidesz and PiS, even when placed 
in national context. Fidesz is the most left-wing Hungarian party in economic terms 
(although it focuses mainly on social and cultural issues over economic issues), 
while the same is almost true of PiS - only the left-wing Lewica party outflanks it to 
the left in economic terms. On the flipside, in economic terms the SDS is an outlier in 
Slovenia’s political arena considering how far to the right it leans, unlike the other 
two right-wing populist parties studied.  
 
In terms of policy, the divides between the two party groupings are limited to a 
number of particular dimensions. Both groups tend to look less than favourably upon 
immigration and multiculturalism, although the latter is a more salient issue for the 
right-wing populist grouping, and when accounting for national political contexts PiS, 
Fidesz and the SDS take tougher stances compared to ANO 2011, OL’aNO and 
GERB. With this in mind, one would expect the right-wing populists to score higher 
on the ingroup/loyalty foundation, much like traditional conservative parties have 
tended to in previous analyses of parties using MFT. 
 
On economic issues, the split in the right-wing populist group remains, although 
Fidesz aligns more with the SDS than PiS regarding redistribution and tax cuts, and 
with PiS more on deregulation, government intervention and protectionism. 
Meanwhile the three centrist populist parties maintain a relatively consistent line, with 
GERB being slightly more pro-market than ANO 2011 and OL’aNO, particularly 
when considering the political centre ground in Bulgaria. However, overall there is 
nothing regarding economic policy that would change previous assumptions about 
where the parties would fall on the MFT foundations, with Fidesz and PiS 




When considering other policy dimensions, clear divides between the centrist 
populist parties and the right-wing populist parties continue to appear. On 
environmental issues, once domestic political contexts are accounted for, there is a 
clearer anti-environmentalism bent for the right-wing party trio, with the centrist trio 
tending to adopt middle of the road views regarding the environment (though ANO 
2011 leans to the right). Similarly, when considering attitudes to the urban/rural 
divide Fidesz, PiS and the SDS form a relatively homogenous pro-rural triumvirate, 
with the centrist parties being more balanced in their views. In abstract terms the 
same divide is also clear when considering attitudes to Russian interference, which 
is more salient for the right-wing populists overall, although it diminishes in 
importance when contextualised - suggesting it is influenced more by (real or 
presumed) vulnerability to Russia than ideological beliefs. 
 
However, the aforementioned policy dimensions are likely to have limited effect on 
the results of the MFT analysis. While environmentalism is generally linked with 
more traditionally left-wing values, the difference between the two groups is not 
expected to be large enough to have a major effect on any of the foundations. The 
same is likely to be true of attitudes to the urban/rural divide, although it may have a 
small effect on fairness/proportionality if the urban/rural cleavage in domestic politics 
is aligned with socioeconomic cleavages. Finally, the historic context regarding 
Russia within the region likely makes attitudes to Russian interference too “noisy” to 
be a reliable indicator of anything on the MFT scale. Yet that is not to say that other 
policy dimensions do not have reasonable predictive power, as a number of others 
tie neatly into the MFT framework due to their linkage with the liberal/authoritarian 
divide. 
 
Overall, the right-wing populist parties are far more socially conservative (particularly 
when accounting for context), look much more favourably on the role of religion in 
politics, and have stronger stances on law and order - though the latter is 
nonetheless an issue of some importance to the centrist populists. Taken in concert, 
one would expect these political stances to correlate with a higher score on the 
authority/respect and sanctity/purity foundations for Fidesz, PiS and the SDS 
compared to ANO 2011, OL’aNO and GERB, replicating the observed 
liberal/conservative split in earlier studies using MFT. Similarly, the strong opposition 
to minority rights and heavy reliance on anti-Islam rhetoric by the right-wing populist 
parties contrasts strongly with the neutral views on minority rights and Islam of the 
centrist populists (or even slightly positive views in the case of GERB), suggests they 
would be expected to score higher on the loyalty/ingroup foundation. The 
aforementioned themes also align with attitudes to nationalism amongst the parties 
studied, another likely proxy for the loyalty/ingroup score, although OL’aNO are more 
nationalist than the average Slovak party so could be reasonably expected to also 
score slightly higher on the loyalty/ingroup foundation than ANO 2011 and GERB. In 
these regards, Fidesz, PiS and the SDS fit reasonably well with the definitions put 
forward by Mudde (2007: 28) for what constitutes a radical right party, with their 
emphasis on nativism. 
 
There are also issues which do not provide discernible trends for the two groupings. 
The topic of decentralisation is one, with SDS’ favourable outlook on the concept 
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diametrically opposed to the pro-centralisation views of Fidesz and PiS. On the 
people vs elite dimension there is dissension within the centrist populist grouping, as 
OL’aNO is far more pro-people than GERB and ANO 2011, and on the topic of 
corruption there is a real divide between the SDS (who see corruption as a major 
issue) and Fidesz (who attribute little importance to it as an issue). Unsurprisingly for 
a group of populist parties, anti-establishment rhetoric is very important regardless of 
whether they are centrist or right-wing, with one exception in the form of GERB - 
both overall, and in the context of the Bulgarian party system. This could be 
attributed in part due to their time in power, which combined with a more moderate 
approach to begin with has lead to a softening of anti-establishment rhetoric so as 
not to draw fire upon themselves, so to speak.  
 
While the Chapel Hill Expert Survey is incredibly useful for providing a baseline 
snapshot of political positioning, it does have limitations in that it is based upon a 
subjective interpretation of party attitudes. One of the best examples of a case 
meriting further consideration is that of Fidesz’s economic position. According to the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Fidesz are considered to be left-leaning economically, yet 
a murkier picture appears when assessing their actual policies and objectives in the 
economic sphere during their period in power from 2010 to the present day. While in 
some aspects Fidesz is undoubtedly statist, there are also aspects of the party’s 
economic policy which conform more with traditional right-wing liberal economic 
orthodoxy. 
 
In support of the statement that Fidesz is left-leaning economically there are a 
number of policies that can be cited. The combination of sectoral “mega taxes”, the 
nationalisation of private pension accounts, creation of public works programmes 
and provision of increased welfare benefits for families (Tacconi, 2018) would not 
look out of place in the manifesto of a left-wing political party. However, at the same 
time Fidesz has introduced a flat income tax alongside rounds of punitive austerity, 
which have resulted in redistribution favouring the rich over the poor, and both of 
which are policies more traditionally associated with right-wing economics 
(Scheiring, 2020: 6-7). This inconsistency can be explained by Fidesz’s overarching 
economic model, which seeks to meet dual objectives often considered incompatible 
- creating a friendly environment for business, and prioritising the interests of 
Hungarians (and by extension Hungarian companies) above all else. 
 
This model has been described as a form of authoritarian capitalism, which has been 
built by securing the support of domestic economic elites (by acting against the 
interests of multinational economic actors), but also keeping corporation tax low 
enough to remain attractive to foreign investment (Scheiring, 2018). The bargain that 
Fidesz has struck effectively allows them to adopt an interventionist stance 
combining protectionism and economic nationalism, while not completely losing the 
confidence of business. This best of both worlds approach can be ascribed to what 
Petsinis (2020) terms “artificial anti-capitalism”, which can be seen as a strategic 
choice by Fidesz to cover off the advance of Jobbik, who had previously adopted a 







Study Focus, Aim and Conceptualisation 
 
This study focuses upon right-of-centre populist parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the language they use in their communications. The parties studied are 
split into two sub-groups for the purposes of the research: the centrist populist 
parties, and the right-wing populist parties. The independent variables being studied 
are the five foundations of the Moral Foundations scale (care/harm, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation), 
with the research undertaken aiming to identify a distinctive Moral Foundations 
“pattern” for the parties studied, both for right-of-centre populists as a whole and for 
the two previously mentioned sub-groups. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The primary research question is therefore: is it possible to identify a distinctive 
Moral Foundations “pattern” in the communications of right-of-centre populist parties 
in Central and Eastern Europe? This primary question can then be broken down into 
two sub-questions, replacing “right-of-centre” with either “centrist” or “right-wing” to 
align with the subgroups used. Additionally, it can be applied at the level of the 
individual parties studied, although with limited reference points with which to work it 
is harder to ascertain findings at such a level. In terms of a primary hypothesis, it is 
proposed that overall right-of-centre populist parties will display a Moral Foundations 
“pattern” in line with the findings for conservatives in their communications, with the 
exception of the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations where they will appear 
to have more in common with the findings for liberals (in the American sense of the 
word). As a sub-hypothesis, it is also proposed that the difference from traditional 
conservatives will be more pronounced for the right-wing populist party grouping 




This research takes the form of a few-N case study, looking at six particular cases: 
ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic, Fidesz in Hungary, GERB in Bulgaria, OL’aNO in 
Slovakia, PiS in Poland and the SDS in Slovenia. The case studies were selected as 
part of a Most-Similar-System-Design (MSSD), with all of the parties chosen in 
power at the time the research commenced, having been described as populist and 
right-wing or centre-right in their political positioning (Kyle and Meyer, 2020: 19-21; 
Devlin and Mordecai, 2019; Dinev and Bankov, 2021; Downes, 2020), and being in 
post-communist EU member states (ensuring a degree of similarity in their political 
contexts, as well as their ideologies). Throughout the research the findings for each 
of the case studies will be considered individually as well as part of the collective 
findings, with the application of the existing Moral Foundations Theory to their 
communications in order to generate new knowledge. Moral Foundations Theory has 
not been previously applied in the context of Central and Eastern European politics, 





Operationalisation and Research Methods 
 
Choosing how to assess the parties studied against the Moral Foundations posed a 
degree of challenge. The use of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) created 
for research of this nature was given consideration first and foremost, however the 
usage of the MFQ would have required arranging a large number of interviews 
across multiple countries, and therefore was not a feasible path for this research to 
take. Therefore an alternative approach was adopted based on the usage of Moral 
Foundations Dictionaries (MFDs) and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
software, which has previously been used for research using Moral Foundations 
Theory. Instead of interviewing voters, party communications were used as a proxy 
to understand how the parties studied solicited support from voters through the lens 
of Moral Foundations Theory. This takes the form of calculating the frequency (per 
100 words) with which words attributed to each of the Moral Foundations by the 
MFDs occur in text in order to identify trends.  
 
However, identifying the most suitable party communications to be analysed posed a 
significant degree of challenge. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic access to physical 
campaign materials was effectively out of the question, as travelling to access 
archives was not possible in light of the circumstances. Consideration was then 
given to the use of social media posts as content for analysis, in line with some of 
the previous research conducted using Moral Foundations Theory. Yet this too 
raised issues which would have limited the study, as not all of the selected case 
studies were present on the social media platforms that could be potentially used 
(primarily Facebook and Twitter) raising questions around comparability. 
Additionally, developing the technical skills needed in order to collect the data 
required would have likely proven to be impractical in the timeframe of the research 
due to the difficulty in accessing historical social media posts due to the nature of the 
sites themselves. 
 
Following consultation with supervisors, consideration was given to using records of 
speeches from the European Parliament. This would have solved problems 
regarding the availability and comparability of data, but would not have been 
appropriate for the aims of the study, as it would not be an appropriate proxy for how 
parties communicated with their voters. Instead, news articles from the websites of 
the parties studied in the thirty days preceding election day were selected as the 
body of text to be analysed. While this selection contained a large degree of 
variability in terms of the number, subjects and length of articles to be analysed, it 
ensured that a basic degree of comparability could be ensured across the research, 
and that the findings would be based on material of a consistent nature. This was 
something that was particularly important to ensure given the use of a theory that 
analyses specific word usage, as Moral Foundations Theory does. 
 
For the analysis, two Moral Foundations Dictionaries were used: the original MFD 
created by Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) as part of the initial development of 
Moral Foundations Theory, and the refined MFD 2.0 developed by Frimer et al. 
(2019). The MFD 2.0 was developed by members of the same team that worked on 
the original MFD, but seeks to expand the dictionary to be more similar in size to the 
dictionaries normally used for linguistic analysis. Therefore the MFD 2.0 offers an 
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opportunity to more closely examine each of the foundations, with Frimer et al. 
(2019) finding that it additionally offers greater validity. However, the decision was 
taken to conduct analysis using both MFDs in order to ensure comparability with 
previous research using Moral Foundations Theory which used the original MFD in 
order to generate results. The MFD 2.0 does however offer greater opportunities for 
more in-depth analysis of word usage, so is therefore a valuable tool for the second 
stage of this research. Therefore, the use of both MFDs rather than just one ensures 
the robustness of the results in two different ways, with the original MFD being used 
to provide consistency and comparability, and the MFD 2.0 used to provide a more 
comprehensive and in-depth understanding of specific word usage patterns.  
 
Limitations of the study and resulting adaptations 
 
The core limitation of the study regards the use of non-English language source 
materials. Given the sheer volume of text collected for analysis it was impractical to 
seek to translate them manually in the time frame available, and therefore a Machine 
Translation (MT) approach was opted for. While the quality of MT is continually 
improving, it remains an imperfect tool and cannot be reasonably expected to 
replace human translation in a great deal of circumstances. However, the nature of 
the research conducted removes some of the barriers to using MT. As the MFDs 
score only individual words rather than sentences, the need for MT to produce 
flowing, grammatically perfect expressions is removed - instead, it needs only to 
correctly translate each individual word.  
 
Originally consideration was given to translating the MFDs first and then applying 
them to the raw source material, however this posed a number of challenges. First 
and foremost, the grammatical rules of the languages in which the party 
communications were written are heavily case- and/or gender-based, meaning that a 
single word in an English language MFD could conceivably correspond to twenty or 
more words when translated, a process that would increase complexity and prove 
incredibly time consuming. In addition, the need to be able to analyse precise word 
usage in order to draw out common themes for each party on each of the 
foundations would have necessitated re-translation into English if the MFDs 
themselves were originally translated into another language.  
 
Therefore, the decision was taken to translate all of the text collected from analysis 
of the news articles on party websites using MT rather than translating the MFDs. Of 
course, this increased the possibility for translation errors to adversely affect the 
results of the research, so a quality assurance procedure was introduced in order to 
check translation validity. Translations were firstly conducted using the DeepL 
translator, which was chosen due to being considered the most accurate MT 
software available (DeepL, 2020). This is in part due to it being trained using the 
Linguee database that primarily gathers translation pairs by analyses of documents 
published by the European Union, which provides a large corpus of thematically 
similar and accurate text in the languages covered by the study (Smolentceva, 
2018). The same text was then analysed using Google Translate, and highlighted 
words contained within the MFD 2.0 (chosen for this exercise due to being wider in 
scope) that were present in one translation but not the other. These words were then 
quality checked against bilingual dictionaries to ensure the most accurate word was 
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chosen, so as to reduce error in the findings due to incorrect translation. Edited 
translations were then run through the LIWC program to generate the analysis that is 
presented in totality in this research. This resulted in a small number of changes, as 
detailed in the table below: 
 
Table 1:  
Manual checks of the original DeepL translations and resulting changes 
Party Manual Checks Changes 
ANO 2011 28 15 
Fidesz 332 269 
GERB 61 23 
OL’aNO 40 15 
PiS 37 12 
SDS 98 56 
 
While the number of changes in isolation may seem high, there are mitigating factors 
to consider even before looking at the size of the data samples used in the study. A 
significant proportion of the changes that were made were simply to deal with issues 
such as DeepL choosing “organisation”, “organisations” and “honour”, which Google 
Translate instead translated as “organization”, “organizations” and “honor”. The latter 
words are scored by the MFDs while the former are not, meaning that by making that 
change a more accurate result could be calculated during the analysis. However, this 
involved making a large number of changes to the original translation. For example 
in the case of Fidesz alone changes to “organisation” and “organisations” accounted 
for around 200 of the 269 edits made, and while the absolute number was lower for 
the other parties studied, a similar trend remained - only the translations for GERB 
and PiS did not present issues of this nature requiring correction. Ultimately, the 
largest effect of these edits on the results for any of the foundations in the final 
analysis was an increase of 0.04 (equivalent to an additional word contained in the 
MFD being used once in every 2,500 words), suggesting it had limited impact on the 
results themselves, but was a useful validation exercise nonetheless. 
 
In terms of sample size, there are obvious limitations. By standardising the data 
collection across the case studies based upon time periods rather than selecting a 
specific number of articles or a predefined word count, there is of course a wide 
variation between the parties studied in the amount of material available for analysis. 
The exact figures used for the analysis in this research are contained in the table 








Table 2: Time periods studied for each party with accompanying article and 
word counts 
Party Collection Period Article Count Word Count 
ANO 2011 21/09/2017 to 19/10/2017 14 15,331 
Fidesz 09/03/2018 to 07/04/2018 540 189,541 
GERB 05/03/2021 to 02/04/2021 462 167,519 
OL’aNO 30/01/2020 to 26/02/2020 13 8,713 
PiS 13/09/2019 to 11/10/2019 84 17,904 
SDS 04/05/2018 to 01/06/2018 124 74,631 
 
It is clearly apparent from looking at the data presented in the table that Fidesz and 
GERB have a far greater corpus of text available for analysis, with the SDS also 
having significantly more than ANO 2011, OL’aNO and PiS, even while having less 
than half the amount of the firstly mentioned parties. However, given the nature of 
the analysis this should not be expected to have a major impact on the findings of 
the research. All of the analysis conducted will focus on the frequency with which 
words are used as a percentage, rather than in raw terms, therefore creating a 
degree of comparability. Additionally, taking this approach is less problematic when 
trying to ensure consistency than any alternative would be. Attempting to standardise 
word or article counts across the parties studied would create greater data validity 
issues, as it would require using different time periods and therefore remove a core 









The first analysis of the data collected from party webpages took place using the 
modified versions of the translations provided by DeepL, following comparison with 
alternative translations and appropriate edits being made. Two versions were 
produced for PiS: v1 refers to the party as Law and Justice in the analysis, and v2 
refers to it as PiS. This is due to the moral foundations dictionaries used scoring the 
words “law” and “justice” which lead to skewed results for PiS on the fairness 
foundation due to the literal translation of the party’s name. The numbers indicate the 
frequency with which words on each foundation can be found in the text analysed, 
per 100 words. For example, a score of 0.50 on the care foundation would represent 
1 in every 200 words used in the communications of the relevant party being 
included in the care component of the MFD 2.0. 
 
Table 3: Individual party scores using the MFD 2.0 
Party Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity 
ANO 2011 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.33 
GERB 0.58 0.10 0.69 0.75 0.37 
OL’aNO 0.93 0.48 0.79 0.88 0.21 
Fidesz 0.71 0.23 1.16 0.94 0.27 
PiS v1 0.54 2.65 0.93 0.79 0.14 
PiS v2 0.56 0.42 0.95 0.81 0.15 
SDS 0.62 0.35 0.79 0.81 0.15 
 
The high score on the fairness foundation for the first PiS calculation is an obvious 
outlier and should be discounted due to the “Law” and “Justice” source of error noted 
previously, but there are also other slight extremes on the other foundations. GERB’s 
fairness score is significantly lower than the rest (particularly when contrasted with 
the other centrist populist parties), while Fidesz and PiS, the latter in both versions, 
have significantly higher scores on the loyalty foundation than the other parties 
studied. However, in order to discern trends it is worth considering the average 
breakdown for the two party groupings, shown below (v1 and v2 refer to the PiS 










Table 4: Average party grouping scores using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity 
Centrist 0.72 0.40 0.71 0.75 0.30 
Right v1 0.62 1.08 0.96 0.85 0.19 
Right v2 0.63 0.33 0.97 0.85 0.19 
 
When looking at the trends for the two groups of parties, a clearer pattern emerges. 
The loyalty and authority foundations stand out as the preserve of the right-wing 
populist parties, while the care and fairness foundations seem to be the domain of 
the centrist populists (notwithstanding the skewed result in the calculation of the first 
version). This is in line with the previous findings of research using moral foundations 
theory that care and fairness are more important to those who lean left and loyalty 
and authority to those who lean right (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009: 1033). 
However, the same analysis found that sanctity was significantly more important to 
the right than the left, and yet the results above show the inverse relationship to be 
true. Considering that of the right-wing populist parties studied only Fidesz scored 
comparably to the centrist populist parties on the sanctity foundation, this is an area 
that needs to be studied further by considering which words and phrases were 
identified in the analysis. However, before doing so it is worth assessing the same 
data presented above, but using the original Moral Foundations Dictionary: 
 
Table 5: Individual party scores using the original MFD 
Party Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity 
ANO 2011 0.34 0.08 0.40 0.56 0.12 
GERB 0.18 0.03 0.50 0.50 0.09 
OL’aNO 0.42 0.10 0.57 0.57 0.06 
Fidesz 0.43 0.05 1.33 0.45 0.07 
PiS v1 0.33 1.32 0.67 1.58 0.04 
PiS v2 0.33 0.22 0.69 0.46 0.04 
SDS 0.31 0.12 0.74 0.46 0.04 
 
It is worth noting that using the original MFD results in the outlier value for PiS being 
transferred across two foundations, as the word “law” is accounted for as part of the 
authority foundation rather than in the fairness foundation as with the MFD 2.0. 
Overall, a pattern can be identified across the foundations, with the original MFD 
generally scoring the right-wing populist parties higher than the centrist populist 
parties on all foundations other than authority and sanctity. This is borne out by the 




Table 6: Average party grouping scores using the original MFD 
Grouping Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity 
Centrist 0.31 0.07 0.49 0.54 0.09 
Right v1 0.36 0.50 0.91 0.83 0.05 
Right v2 0.36 0.13 0.92 0.46 0.05 
 
As expected with the use of a smaller dictionary, the averages and absolute values 
are noticeably lower for each foundation than in the analysis using the MFD 2.0. The 
only exception comes on the loyalty foundation for the right-wing populist parties, 
which is in large part due to the outsize Fidesz score on that foundation, as well as 
the SDS scoring comparably on both analyses. This is an area that merits further 
consideration and will be covered in depth in the next section, looking at the actual 
language used and how it compares between the individual parties studied and the 
two groupings as a whole. The same is true of the sanctity foundation, which 
continues to defy expected patterns based on previous research with moral 
foundations theory. It is also worth noting that using the original MFD results in an 
inversion of the expected pattern on all foundations except loyalty, although it can be 
argued that the differences are small enough between the averages of the two 
groups on the other four foundations so as not to be overly significant.  
 
With regards to the original hypotheses put forward, challenges to their validity are 
presented by both of the analyses conducted. When the MFD 2.0 is used, there 
appears to be a degree of validity in the hypothesis that “right-of-centre populist 
parties will display a Moral Foundations “pattern” in line with the findings for 
conservatives in their communications, with the exception of the care/harm and 
fairness/cheating foundations where they will appear to have more in common with 
the findings for liberals”, at least for the centrist populist grouping where the scores 
on the care foundation are comparable to those on the loyalty and authority 
foundations. However, the same is not true for the right-wing populist grouping when 
the MFD 2.0 is used, nor for either grouping when the original MFD is used. In both 
analyses it is apparent that a greater premium is being put on the care foundation 
than would be expected from traditional conservative parties, but the same effect is 
not evident for fairness - and certainly not evident to the extreme that could have 
been expected. Additionally, the remarkably low scores on the sanctity foundation do 
not tally with expectations, considering similar scores would be expected to those 
observed on the loyalty and authority foundations. 
 
While the findings for the sanctity foundation remain somewhat of a mystery, there 
could potentially be an explanation for the slightly lower than expected scores on the 
care and fairness foundations. As was previously highlighted, the two foundations 
are given greater preference in Western societies due to their individualizing nature 
(Federico et al., 2013: 591). While the degree of cultural difference between the 
countries included in the study and Western Europe is not as large as could be 
observed in other cases, accounting for such an effect would bring the findings for 
the care foundation at least in line with the original hypothesis. However, like the 
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sanctity foundation the scores for the fairness foundation remain significantly lower 
than would have been expected even when accounting for potential differences in 
cultural context. 
 
The second original hypothesis to be tested by this research was that “the difference 
from traditional conservatives will be more pronounced for the right-wing populist 
party grouping than the centrist-populist party grouping”. When measuring this on the 
three foundations that are most important to traditional conservatives a mixed pattern 
emerges. The loyalty foundation is more important to the right-wing populist grouping 
and the sanctity foundation to the centrist populist grouping across both analyses, 
while the scores on the authority foundation give a slight edge to the centrist populist 
grouping when the original MFD is used, and to the right-wing populist grouping 
when the MFD 2.0 is used. However, the difficulties in identifying a settled pattern for 
the care and fairness foundations across the two analyses makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether this hypothesis is correct. If the data from the MFD 2.0 is used 
then there is a weak case to be made in favour of the hypothesis, but the opposite is 
true when considering the results arising from the use of the original MFD.  
 
Virtues and Vices 
One of the ways in which the usage of different foundations by the parties studied 
can be assessed further is by looking at the scores for the vice and virtue aspects of 
each foundation. The concepts of virtue and vice aspects were developed by 
Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) as part of the original MFD and allow for 
classification of words related to each of the foundations into positive (virtue) or 
negative (vice) concepts. For example, in the case of the original MFD words such 
as “safe”, “care” and “sympathy” form part of the virtue aspect of the care foundation, 
while words such as “harm”, “exploit” and “attack” form part of the vice aspect 
(Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009). Considering the scores on each foundation 
through the prism of the virtue and vice aspects is therefore useful in order to see 
whether the parties studied speak about the foundations in positive or negative 
tones, and whether there is an identifiable difference in approach depending on their 
ideological leanings. The tables below show the virtue and vice scores for each 


















Table 7: Individual party scores on the care foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Party Virtue Vice Care (total) 
ANO 2011 0.45 0.21 0.66 
GERB 0.52 0.06 0.58 
OL’aNO 0.76 0.17 0.93 
Fidesz 0.42 0.29 0.71 
PiS v1 0.42 0.12 0.54 
PiS v2 0.43 0.13 0.56 
SDS 0.48 0.14 0.62 
 
Table 8:  
Average party grouping scores on the care foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Virtue Vice Care (total) 
Centrist 0.58 0.15 0.72 
Right v1 0.44 0.18 0.62 
Right v2 0.44 0.19 0.63 
 
Considering the data presented above for the care foundation, it is clear that the 
centrist populists focus more on the virtue aspect than the right-wing populists 
(therefore speaking in more positive and altruistic terms) while the right-wing populist 
parties focus more on the vice aspect (focusing on potential sources of harm) than 
the centrist populist parties. However, for both groupings the virtue aspect is more 
important - only the proportion of the score on the care foundation differs. 
Additionally, the higher average score on the vice aspect for the right-wing populist 
parties is entirely due to Fidesz scoring twice the other parties in the grouping, so 
may be of limited significance. Indeed, when the results using the original MFD are 
considered (see below) it becomes apparent that the high vice score for Fidesz 
accounts for most of the difference for this foundation, suggesting that there is either 
a slight edge for the centrist populist parties (with the MFD 2.0) or similar levels of 












Table 9: Individual party scores on the care foundation using the original MFD 
Party Virtue Vice Care (total) 
ANO 2011 0.19 0.15 0.34 
GERB 0.14 0.04 0.18 
OL’aNO 0.32 0.10 0.42 
Fidesz 0.24 0.19 0.43 
PiS v1 0.24 0.09 0.33 
PiS v2 0.24 0.09 0.33 
SDS 0.22 0.09 0.31 
 
Table 10:  
Average party grouping scores on the care foundation using the original MFD 
Grouping Virtue Vice Care (total) 
Centrist 0.22 0.10 0.31 
Right v1 0.23 0.12 0.36 
Right v2 0.23 0.12 0.36 
 
The outlier nature of Fidesz on the vice aspect of the care foundation (effectively the 
harm part of the full care/harm foundation name) will be covered in more depth when 
looking at the linguistic choices used in more depth at a later stage. However, it is 
clear overall that along with OL’aNO’s outsized virtue score (which also merits 
further investigation) it represents an outlier, and that the difference between the two 
groupings is almost non-existent using the original MFD. A similar trend can be 


















Table 11: Individual party scores on the fairness foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Party Virtue Vice Fairness (total) 
ANO 2011 0.51 0.11 0.62 
GERB 0.09 0.01 0.10 
OL’aNO 0.26 0.19 0.45 
Fidesz 0.17 0.06 0.23 
PiS v1 2.58 0.07 2.65 
PiS v2 0.35 0.07 0.42 
SDS 0.29 0.06 0.35 
 
 
Table 12:  
Average party grouping scores on the fairness foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Virtue Vice Fairness (total) 
Centrist 0.30 0.10 0.40 
Right v1 1.01 0.06 1.08 
Right v2 0.27 0.06 0.33 
 
Using the MFD 2.0, the virtue and vice scores on the care foundation reveal relative 
consistency across the two groupings, with the centrist populist parties scoring 
slightly higher on both when the skewed PiS data is ignored. However, there is a 
great degree of variance within both groupings which will need further assessment. 
Most striking are the significantly lower than average scores for GERB and Fidesz 
(the former on both virtue and vice, the latter on just virtue), which could be 
explained in part by lower levels of corruption salience for the two parties, although 
PiS would be expected to score lower for the same reason. Similarly, ANO 2011 and 
OL’aNO are outliers on the virtue and vice aspects respectively, scoring much higher 
than would be expected - which could potentially be related to the same trend 
around corruption. However, as will be shown in the following section, it is difficult to 
ascertain any significant differences in the language used by GERB and Fidesz 
compared to the other parties studied on the fairness foundation. That being said, 










Table 13:  
Individual party scores on the fairness foundation using the original MFD 
Party Virtue Vice Fairness (total) 
ANO 2011 0.06 0.02 0.08 
GERB 0.03 0.00 0.03 
OL’aNO 0.08 0.02 0.10 
Fidesz 0.04 0.01 0.05 
PiS v1 1.30 0.02 1.32 
PiS v2 0.20 0.02 0.22 
SDS 0.09 0.03 0.12 
 
Table 14: Average party grouping scores on the fairness foundation using the 
original MFD 
Grouping Virtue Vice Fairness (total) 
Centrist 0.06 0.01 0.07 
Right v1 0.48 0.02 0.50 
Right v2 0.11 0.02 0.13 
 
The virtue and vice scores on the fairness foundation using the original MFD are 
somewhat different from those generated using the MFD 2.0. While the average vice 
scores remain relatively similar across the party groupings, the average of the virtue 
score has been inverted, with the right-wing populist parties now scoring higher. This 
is driven by PiS (using the adjusted data) becoming an outlier on the virtue aspect, 
on which ANO 2011’s score has also fallen significantly - the reasons behind this will 
be covered in the linguistic analysis section, when comparing the two dictionaries. 
GERB and Fidesz are no longer as clear outliers as they were (although they 
maintain the lowest scores on both aspects of the foundation) while OL’aNO’s score 
on the vice aspect is more consistent with the other parties in its grouping with the 
use of the original MFD than with the MFD 2.0. 
 
A more consistent pattern can be identified when looking at the loyalty foundation, 
which was the only foundation to score as expected with both the original MFD and 
the MFD 2.0 (the right-wing populist parties scoring higher on both). Using the MFD 
2.0 the virtue and vice aspects are relatively consistent across the parties studied, 
with the virtue aspect accounting for the entirety of the loyalty foundation in the 
cases of all but OL’aNO and PiS. Even in the latter two cases, the vice dimension 
contributes such a small amount so as not to be particularly significant, as seen in 




Table 15: Individual party scores on the loyalty foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Party Virtue Vice Loyalty (total) 
ANO 2011 0.65 0.00 0.65 
GERB 0.69 0.00 0.69 
OL’aNO 0.78 0.01 0.79 
Fidesz 1.16 0.00 1.16 
PiS v1 0.92 0.01 0.93 
PiS v2 0.94 0.01 0.95 
SDS 0.79 0.00 0.79 
 
Table 16:  
Average party grouping scores on the loyalty foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Virtue Vice Loyalty (total) 
Centrist 0.71 0.00 0.71 
Right v1 0.96 0.00 0.96 
Right v2 0.96 0.00 0.97 
 
On the other hand, the original MFD produces a more mixed picture. While the 
overall trend remains the same, the split between the virtue and vice dimensions for 
the loyalty foundation is more pronounced. Despite lower scores overall 
(unsurprising considering the original MFD has a smaller scope), the vice scores 
increased for all of the parties studied except for OL’aNO. Also of note is the 
increase in the Fidesz score, which is out of line with the decreases seen for the 
other parties - only the SDS remains relatively comparable, and in both cases is 
driven by an increase on the vice dimension which merits further study in the textual 
analysis section that follows this one. However, the overall trend remains clear. The 
right-wing populist parties not only rely more heavily on the loyalty foundation than 














Table 17:  
Individual party scores on the loyalty foundation using the original MFD 
Party Virtue Vice Loyalty (total) 
ANO 2011 0.34 0.06 0.40 
GERB 0.47 0.03 0.50 
OL’aNO 0.56 0.01 0.57 
Fidesz 0.87 0.46 1.33 
PiS v1 0.65 0.02 0.67 
PiS v2 0.67 0.02 0.69 
SDS 0.64 0.10 0.74 
 
Table 18: Average party grouping scores on the loyalty foundation using the 
original MFD 
Grouping Virtue Vice Loyalty (total) 
Centrist 0.46 0.03 0.49 
Right v1 0.72 0.19 0.91 
Right v2 0.73 0.19 0.92 
 
In the overall analysis, the authority foundation showed mixed results. The 
expectation would have been for the right-wing populist parties to outscore the 
centrist populist parties, yet according to the MFD 2.0 analysis only ANO 2011 
scored significantly lower than Fidesz, PiS and the SDS. Where a slight distinction 
can be made is in the virtue and vice dimensions, with the latter showing higher 
scores for the right-wing populist parties, although it must be stated that in absolute 
terms the figure remains very small (as shown in the tables below), representing a 
difference in word frequency of 1 word per every 2,500. However, despite the low 
scores on the vice aspect of the authority foundation for both groupings, there is a 
clearly discernible trend to support the assertion that the right-wing populists lean 













Table 19:  
Individual party scores on the authority foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Party Virtue Vice Authority (total) 
ANO 2011 0.61 0.02 0.63 
GERB 0.74 0.01 0.75 
OL’aNO 0.82 0.06 0.88 
Fidesz 0.85 0.09 0.94 
PiS v1 0.75 0.04 0.79 
PiS v2 0.77 0.04 0.81 
SDS 0.72 0.09 0.81 
 
Table 20:  
Average party grouping scores on the authority foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Virtue Vice Authority (total) 
Centrist 0.72 0.03 0.75 
Right v1 0.77 0.07 0.85 
Right v2 0.78 0.07 0.85 
 
Despite the inversion of the overall scoring relationship when using the original MFD 
to score the parties on the authority foundation - that is to say, the centrist populist 
grouping scoring higher overall - the trend remains that the vice aspect is clearly 
more important to the right-wing populist parties. Using the original MFD the centrist 
populist parties all score near zero on the vice aspect, similar to PiS but significantly 
less than Fidesz and the SDS when accounting for the smallness of the absolute 
numbers. This is despite the overall score on the authority foundation falling more 
dramatically for the right-wing populist parties than the centrist populist parties when 















Table 21:  
Individual party scores on the authority foundation using the original MFD 
Party Virtue Vice Authority (total) 
ANO 2011 0.55 0.01 0.56 
GERB 0.50 0.00 0.50 
OL’aNO 0.56 0.01 0.57 
Fidesz 0.38 0.07 0.45 
PiS v1 1.57 0.01 1.58 
PiS v2 0.45 0.01 0.46 
SDS 0.37 0.09 0.46 
 
Table 22: Average party grouping scores on the authority foundation using the 
original MFD 
Grouping Virtue Vice Authority (total) 
Centrist 0.54 0.01 0.54 
Right v1 0.77 0.06 0.83 
Right v2 0.40 0.06 0.46 
 
Finally, the virtue and vice aspects of the sanctity foundation. Sanctity was a 
foundation that produced what could be perceived as anomalous results, with the 
centrist populist grouping scoring higher than the right-wing populist grouping despite 
previous research showing that the sanctity foundation increased in importance as 
you move rightwards across the political spectrum (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009: 
1033). When splitting the values across the virtue and vice aspects of the foundation 
the pattern is clarified, but still remains somewhat of a curiosity. Using the MFD 2.0 
the centrist populist parties and right-wing populist parties score almost equally on 
the virtue aspect, with the difference being made up almost entirely of the vice 
aspect. This is apparent at the party level, where even the outliers of each grouping 
(OL’aNO and Fidesz respectively) remain consistent on the vice aspect, with the 












Table 23: Individual party scores on the sanctity foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Party Virtue Vice Sanctity (total) 
ANO 2011 0.18 0.15 0.33 
GERB 0.24 0.13 0.37 
OL’aNO 0.03 0.18 0.21 
Fidesz 0.23 0.04 0.27 
PiS v1 0.11 0.03 0.14 
PiS v2 0.12 0.03 0.15 
SDS 0.10 0.05 0.15 
 
Table 24:  
Average party grouping scores on the sanctity foundation using the MFD 2.0 
Grouping Virtue Vice Sanctity (total) 
Centrist 0.15 0.15 0.30 
Right v1 0.15 0.04 0.19 
Right v2 0.15 0.04 0.19 
 
Despite much lower scores on the sanctity foundation overall, the same pattern is 
apparent when using the original MFD. With the exception of ANO 2011, the scores 
on the vice aspect of the sanctity foundation all conformed to a small range of 0.01 to 
0.03 (the difference between an occurrence once in every 10,000 words, and thrice 
in every 10,000 words), despite the slight edge to the centrist populist grouping on 
the foundation. Even ANO 2011’s outlier value of 0.07 was not particularly high, 
against an average of 0.04 for the centrist populist parties on the vice aspect when 
using the original MFD. The gap between the groupings on the virtue aspect of the 
sanctity foundation is also increased compared to the MFD 2.0, but not by a 
particularly significant amount. However, it does confirm the need for further 
investigation through looking at specific word usage to understand the unexpected 













Table 25:  
Individual party scores on the sanctity foundation using the original MFD 
Party Virtue Vice Sanctity (total) 
ANO 2011 0.05 0.07 0.12 
GERB 0.08 0.01 0.09 
OL’aNO 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Fidesz 0.06 0.01 0.07 
PiS v1 0.02 0.02 0.04 
PiS v2 0.02 0.02 0.04 
SDS 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 
Table 26: Average party grouping scores on the sanctity foundation using the 
original MFD 
Grouping Virtue Vice Sanctity (total) 
Centrist 0.05 0.04 0.09 
Right v1 0.03 0.02 0.05 







To better understand the scores on the different MFT foundations, it is worth 
analysing the most commonly used words by each of the parties studied. As some of 
the results generated by the original calculations were unexpected, honing in on the 
individual terms driving them is a useful exercise to assess whether or not the outlier 
scores are in fact an artefact of the arbitrary nature of the MFD. In this section, the 
five most common words found in each foundation will be listed for each party, as 
well as the five most common words overall. Alongside this, any words that occur 
frequently which are significantly different to the general norm will be picked out and 
analysed with reference to their use in context, so as to determine if their 
preponderance is purely a result of repeated references to a specific issue. The first 
party to be considered will be ANO 2011, using the MFD 2.0 firstly, and then the 
original MFD for reference as well. The process will then be repeated for all parties 
before a brief summary and discussion of the results of the six parties studied 
collectively. It is worth noting that due to the lower overall scores on the foundations 
when using the original MFD that the textual analysis is likely to be of less use when 
establishing common themes in the communications of the parties, but it remains a 




For ANO 2011, clear patterns can be established on each of the foundations. The 
care foundation is focused primarily on concepts of health (over a quarter of the total 
when including other healthcare related terms) and aid (over 15% when including all 
forms of “to help”). Fairness is mainly framed around concepts of legality, as the 
plentiful mentions for “law”, “laws” and “rights” attest to,  contributing over 60% of the 
total instances of words scoring on the foundation. It is these references to “law” and 
“laws” that drive the outsize fairness score identified earlier, suggesting that it is a 
relatively true representation of ANO 2011’s communication in terms of MFT.  The 
case of loyalty is notable, as ANO 2011 prefers to talk about companies (almost half 
of the total word usage on the foundation) rather than the country, or indeed other 
forms of group - an outlier as we will later see. When discussing the authority 
foundation, ANO 2011 mainly speaks of concepts of protection and institutions, but 
direct references to crime are limited. ANO 2011’s discourse rooted in the sanctity 
foundation is not overly linked to religion - not unexpected considering the Czech 
political context, characterised by a high degree of secularization (Havlíček and 
Lužný, 2013) - but instead focuses on corruption, as well as strong messaging 
around health once again. Overall, ANO 2011’s use of words in the MFD 2.0 is 
mainly predicated on three areas, business, the law, and healthcare, an unsurprising 










Table 27: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for ANO 
2011 using the MFD 2.0 
 
Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity Overall 




































































































Breaking things down further, there are a number of words used by ANO 2011 which 
are relatively uncommon amongst the other parties studied. One such word is 
“damage”, which is unusually frequent. Half of the occurrences of it in ANO 2011’s 
communication can be explained by reference to a bill enacted in order to protect 
fisherman from damage caused by protected cormorants, suggesting that it is not in 
fact a core part of their communication but instead purely coincidental that it is 
frequently used. Similarly, the word “submitted” (part of the authority foundation) 
occurs far more frequently for ANO 2011 than for the other parties studied, but this is 
predominantly due to discussion of the work of each ANO 2011 deputy during the 
previous parliament, which involved submission of amendments. Finally, the most 
common word on the sanctity foundation being “raw” can be explained by the fact 
that every usage of the word was followed by “material” or “materials”. Therefore a 
large part of the high score for ANO 2011 on the foundation can be explained by the 
inability of the MFD 2.0 to distinguish between meanings of the word “raw”, which in 
this case is wholly used to indicate something unprocessed in nature, rather than 
any more negative connotation.  
 
Comparing the findings for ANO 2011 using the original MFD to those using the MFD 
2.0 it is also possible to highlight a number of key patterns. On the care foundation 
the references to damage and fighting remain, but the focus is moved away from 
healthcare towards a more generic concept of protection, arguably a less emotive 
topic. The strong focus on the law (linked to the discussion of the work of each ANO 
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2011 deputy in the previous parliament) moves across from the fairness foundation 
to the authority foundation when the original MFD is used, although the high score 
for concepts of justice shows that there remains a degree of consistency there. This 
shift also explains the previously identified significant decrease in ANO 2011’s score 
on the virtue aspect of the fairness foundation when comparing the results from the 
use of the MFD 2.0 with those from the use of the original MFD. For the loyalty 
foundation the discussion moves away from companies and the country to more 
generic groups, with the dominance of the term “member” due to the previously 
mentioned discussion about the work of each ANO 2011 deputy. Finally, for sanctity 
the dominant terms refer to notions of cleanliness and ill health, a very different 
dynamic to that previously observed when the MFD 2.0 was used. Overall the 
importance given to the law in ANO 2011’s communication remains, but with the 
smaller corpus of words to consider there is an understandable skew towards more 
functional terms - rather than emotive terms - when the original MFD is used. 
 
Table 28: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for ANO 
2011 using the original MFD 
 






















































































The patterns of language adopted by Fidesz for each of the foundations have a 
number of similarities to those of ANO 2011, but unsurprisingly for a party from the 
right-wing populist grouping, also contain a high degree of variation. The care 
foundation is once again heavily focused on healthcare with “health” and other 
related terms making up around 30% of the total, with references to help and fighting 
as with ANO 2011. Similarly, the fairness foundation is solidified around references 
to the law and to rights, although the words “blackmail” and “lying” stand out as 
somewhat distinctive. However, the loyalty foundation shows a clear divergence as 
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Fidesz relies heavily on the concepts of family and nation, with words relating to the 
latter making up almost half of the party’s score on the foundation. The authority 
foundation is also a source of difference, speaking less of institutions and protection 
and instead of matters of order and leadership. This can in part be explained by the 
fact that Fidesz is a strongly authoritarian party, as well as the party effectively 
becoming a personal vehicle for the political power of Viktor Orbán (Metz and Oross, 
2020: 146-147). On the sanctity foundation there is an expected finding, with 
references to faith and religion (specifically Christianity) making up around 60% of 
the party’s score on this foundation. The limited references to corruption (less than 
5% of the total) align with the Chapel Hill Expert Survey findings about the lack of 
salience corruption holds as an issue for Fidesz (Bakker et al., 2020). The overall 
picture for Fidesz is characterised predominantly by references to order, the nation 
and families, a combination that would be expected of a nationalist right-wing 
populist party running for a third term in power (Bayer, 2018). 
 
Table 29: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
Fidesz using the MFD 2.0 
 








































































































In terms of patterns unique to Fidesz, there are a number of words used which stand 
out from the norm due to their presence in the top five most used words on each 
foundation. Two words used frequently from the fairness foundation stand out: 
“blackmail” and “lying”. The use of “blackmail” is varied throughout Fidesz’s 
communication, often referring to the migrant crisis but being attributed to a number 
of different actors, chief among them George Soros - a common target of Fidesz 
antipathy (Plenta, 2020: 521-522). On the other hand, the references to lying focus 
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upon the perceived untrustworthiness of the Hungarian opposition, both generally 
and in relation to individual politicians such as former Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány. In this regard there is a clear example of the othering at the core of 
populist discourse which is somewhat absent from ANO 2011’s communication, 
which is much more technocratic in nature. The other outliers are somewhat less 
significant however. The frequent references to “food” which is the third most 
referenced word on the sanctity foundation can be attributed purely to discussions of 
prices, quality and the broader agricultural sector, a relatively mundane and technical 
set of issues. Overall, the only term standing out when assessing the totality of 
Fidesz’s communication across all the foundations is “order”. While this is not 
unexpected, it is useful to reconfirm the usage is linked to the concept of social 
order, rather than being used to describe an order being given. What the deeper 
analysis shows is that while there are frequent references to “social order”, a large 
proportion of the uses of the term instead come as part of the phrase “in order”, or in 
reference to Christian Orders. Therefore while the use of “order” fits expectations, 
one must be wary of confirmation bias when assessing just how accurate the scoring 
is. 
 
Similarly to ANO 2011, when considering the most frequently used words with the 
original MFD there are some notable changes. Firstly, on the care foundation the 
references to healthcare (a concept for which terms were added in the MFD 2.0) are 
replaced with a more general series of references to care and protection. 
Interestingly “attacks” joins “fight” as one of the most used words on the care 
foundation for Fidesz, suggesting a more negative framing of topics in the framework 
of their communications, which results in the previously identified high vice score on 
the foundation. As previously mentioned, with “law” being counted as part of the 
authority foundation in the original MFD there is substantial change in the specific 
words used on the fairness foundation, although the overriding theme of justice 
remains, and positive visions of fairness (“fair” and “equal”) are given greater 
prominence. The overriding nationalist sentiment of the loyalty foundation is also still 
apparent using the original MFD, with particular emphasis given to topics of 
immigration and perceived foreign influence, alongside the continued focus on 
families. It is the addition of immigration and related terms when the original MFD is 
used that explains the increase in the score on the loyalty foundation for Fidesz, 
showing that it is a valid increase that reflects the nature of the party’s 
communication. The main themes also remain the same on the authority foundation, 
with the most frequently used words remaining relatively consistent in spite of the 
redeployment of law to that foundation by the MFD 2.0 (which explains the 
previously unexplained increase when switching to the use of the original MFD), and 
the original MFD not scoring specific leadership roles (“leader” is preferred to 
“president” and “prime minister”). For sanctity the heavy focus is on religion, 
illustrating more so than the use of the MFD 2.0 did that there is a strong religious 
element to the discourse of Fidesz, as would be expected from a right-wing populist 
party. Indeed, the overall picture for Fidesz when looking at word usage through the 
prism of the original MFD is not too dissimilar to the picture when using the MFD 2.0 
for analysis. This is not unexpected, but slightly different from ANO 2011 where the 
focus is more on functional rather than emotive words, particularly when comparing 




Table 30: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
Fidesz using the original MFD 
 
















































































































The analysis for GERB is skewed somewhat by the circumstances of the 2021 
Bulgarian parliamentary election, taking place as it did during the Covid-19 
pandemic. As a result, the most commonly used words on a number of foundations 
unsurprisingly are related to the pandemic, limiting the validity of the data to a 
degree. The care foundation provides clear evidence of this, with four of the five 
most common words used relating to healthcare, accounting for almost half of the 
total themselves - although the general focus on healthcare on this foundation is not 
unusual regardless of circumstance. On the other hand, the words used on the 
fairness foundation differ considerably in their general theme from the focus on the 
law as observed in the cases of ANO 2011 and Fidesz, with more emphasis on a 
general notion of trust. The loyalty foundation blends concepts, with the most 
commonly used word being “country” but only narrowly ahead of coalition, with a 
concept of cooperation a standout theme. For the authority foundation the emphasis 
is on the role of the leader, unsurprising considering Boyko Borisov’s personalised 
style of leadership and control of GERB (Bankov, 2020: 47-48), with some reference 
to order. As previously mentioned on the care foundation, the pandemic situation 
had an effect in skewing results, and this is also evident on the sanctity foundation 
where the words “pandemic” and “epidemic” stand out. However, there remains a 
strong focus on religion, somewhat surprisingly for a centrist populist party but 
potentially attributable to the importance of the Orthodox Church in Bulgarian politics 
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and society (Krasteva, 2015: 440-442). The overall pattern for GERB is quite 
balanced however, with four concepts emerging in the five most commonly used 
words: leadership, country, health and partnership (indicated by “coalition” and 
“together”). While there are a large number of references to “country”, the lack of 
references to other notions linked to nationalism are in line with what would be 
expected of a party of GERB’s type, as are the other key overall focuses identified. 
 
Table 31: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
GERB using the MFD 2.0 
 






































































































When considering which words used by GERB stand out as unusual and require a 
degree of further scrutiny there are a number which can be easily identified. Three of 
the aforementioned words constitute high scorers on the fairness foundation: “trust”, 
“lied” and “equal”. The use of the word trust merits further study to ensure that it is 
referring to the action of trusting in another, rather than referring to an organisation 
(e.g. the National Trust) or to a financial entity. Closer analysis shows that GERB’s 
use of trust is in the intended sense, as is the way that it uses the word “equal” to 
refer to notions of equality in almost all the cases it appears. The oft-repeated use of 
“coalition” also merits comment, although in the majority of cases it refers to GERB’s 
electoral coalition rather than looking forward towards the government formation 
process. There are also two relatively uncommon words that appear in the top five 
most commonly used for sanctity foundation: “waste” and “monastery”. The latter can 
be explained by the frequency with which GERB politicians publicised their visits to 
monasteries during the campaign, as well as mentions of work undertaken during the 
previous parliament to build tourism facilities and improve transport links for 
monasteries. While the use of “waste” could be in order to create ideas of 
wastefulness and inefficiency as a part of GERB’s campaign rhetoric, closer 
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examination reveals that this is not the case. Instead, the majority of the references 
are to waste management and matters of that ilk, suggesting that in this aspect of 
their communication GERB is more interested in demonstrating competency than 
making an appeal to voters’ moral intuitions and emotions. 
 
The familiar trends from the analyses of ANO 2011 and Fidesz are also present for 
GERB when comparing the findings using the original MFD to those of the MFD 2.0. 
Firstly, the care foundation moves away from references to healthcare (with the main 
health related terms not included in the original MFD), as in the cases of ANO 2011 
and Fidesz. However, the emphasis for GERB is less on the general notion of 
protection as with the two previously analysed parties, and instead on the more 
generic concept of care. This may be partly explained by the circumstances of the 
GERB case study, taking place during the Covid-19 pandemic, but is an interesting 
point to note regardless. On the fairness foundation the references to trust are no 
longer scored, so the emphasis becomes once again about general concepts of 
fairness and equality. This is in keepings with the findings for ANO 2011, but slightly 
different to Fidesz, suggesting a degree of commonality in the centrist populist 
grouping. The loyalty foundation for GERB is characterised by the use of a varied 
use of words when studied through the prism of the original MFD, with the most 
frequently used being “national”. However, unlike in the case of Fidesz there does 
not seem to be a current of exclusionary nationalism running through GERB’s 
discourse for the loyalty foundation, though there is undoubtedly more attention paid 
to nationalism than in the case of ANO 2011. For the authority foundation the major 
focus when using the original MFD appears to be on leadership, which matches the 
findings of the same exercise using the MFD 2.0 and is likely linked to Boyko 
Borisov’s personalisation of his party (Bankov, 2020: 47-48). There is a degree of 
unexpectedness on the sanctity foundation as well, with GERB frequently using 
words associated with religiosity such as “church”, “holy” and “churches”. However, 
as previously discussed this is more likely a case of national context dictating 
language use and issue salience rather than a matter of ideological positioning. 
When looking at GERB’s results overall, it is clear that there is a great degree of 
consistency between the most common words used when analysing using both the 


















Table 32: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
GERB using the original MFD 
 








































































































OL’aNO’s positioning as the most rightward leaning of the centrist populist parties 
according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey make it an intriguing case study when 
conducting deeper word usage analysis, as it would be expected to mix traits found 
across the two groups. However, when looking at the care foundation it is an outlier 
compared to the parties previously analysed, with the main focus on matters of 
family - the two most commonly used terms being “child” and “mother”. On the 
fairness foundation the legalistic approach adopted by ANO 2011 and Fidesz is 
visible, though that in itself is something which has already been shown to cut across 
groups, as seen by it being a commonality between the two aforementioned parties. 
With regards to the loyalty foundation, the trend from the care foundation continues 
with a heavy focus on family matters, and much less reference to ideas of the nation 
- instead, looking more to inclusionary concepts of togetherness and cooperation. 
Similarly, on the authority foundation the family bent is clear once again, with 
relatively limited reference to governance, perhaps to be expected considering 
OL’aNO’s rise from a recently founded outsider party (Brunnerová, 2019: 107) to 
power. The sanctity foundation is skewed somewhat by the fact that only a small 
number of words scoring on it occur in the corpus of OL’aNO’s communication, but 
of those that do the emphasis is on corruption with limited reference to religion. 
Overall the core of OL’aNO’s communication in MFT terms is based around the 
concept of family, with the four most common words used being “child”, “family”, 
“father” and “mother”, followed by the complementary term “protection”. This is a 
slightly unexpected outcome considering the nature of OL’aNO’s ideological 
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positions, but could perhaps be explained by the small sample size compared to the 
other parties studied. 
 
Table 33: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
OL’aNO using the MFD 2.0 
 










































































































In terms of the more unusual, OL’aNO specific words used more frequently when 
compared to the other parties a number stand out. Firstly, on the care foundation the 
word “benefits” scores highly (though in absolute terms occurs only 4 times, showing 
the small body of text to work with for OL’aNO). The presence of the word can be 
taken to have multiple meanings: either to benefit, or discussing welfare benefits. In 
this case the occurrences of the word all point to the latter, and as such the intended 
use of the word for scoring on the care foundation. The fairness foundation also has 
a pair of slight outliers scoring highly in “robbed” and “fraud”, which have been 
relatively uncommon for the other parties studied - the latter appearing in ANO 
2011’s five most common words on the foundation, but making up a smaller 
proportion. The use of “robbed” is almost entirely for the purpose of criticising the 
outgoing Smer government, which links into the heavy focus on corruption and 
promise of a new politics on which OL’aNO’s political message is based (Mrva and 
Lopatka, 2020). Similarly the use of “fraud” is in much the same vein, focusing upon 
particular situations in which Smer and their associates are said to have defrauded 
the Slovak people, setting up the anti-elite and people-centred discourse at the core 
of populism. The combination of these words as well as others consisting of a similar 
theme explains the high vice score for OL’aNO on the fairness foundation here, 
showing that it is in effect a result of their attempt to make it clear that they represent 
a break from the political establishment. Finally, “protection” takes up the spot as the 
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fifth most common word used by OL’aNO which scores on the MFT foundations 
using the MFD 2.0, suggesting that it is part of the overall family centred approach to 
communication. However, closer examination shows that 60% of the uses of the 
word “protection” actually refer to data protection rather than the protection of 
children and families. Therefore while the overriding theme running throughout 
OL’aNO’s communication in MFT terms is that of family, “protection” is not as closely 
linked to that theme as first thought. 
 
The findings for OL’aNO when looking at specific word usage within the original MFD 
are somewhat skewed by the small sample size. This is particularly apparent when 
looking at the fairness and sanctity foundations, where so few words are scored that 
multiple words which are used a single time show up amongst the lists of the most 
frequently used. On the fairness foundation this represents a divergence from the 
previous findings using the MFD 2.0, although one which can be explained by the 
switch of the term “law” to the authority foundation, with “justice” the most commonly 
used word and the overriding theme. For the sanctity foundation the effect is 
lessened, as while the removal of “corruption” from the foundation when the original 
MFD is used changes the main theme, there is a high degree of commonality in the 
other words used, with the effect of the small sample size clear to see. On the other 
foundations, there remains a high degree of consistency between the MFD 2.0 and 
the original MFD. The care foundation no longer features references to children, but 
is still mainly based around the notion of care (with the outlier value for protection 
covered in the previous paragraph, which explains the unexpectedly high virtue 
score that was previously identified). On the loyalty and authority foundations the 
overriding theme remains that of family, with very limited reference to concepts of 
nationalism, again in keeping with the findings using the MFD 2.0. Indeed, apart from 
the absence of “child” from the original MFD the overall results are almost identical 
when either MFD is used. This is likely in part due to the small sample size as 
previously noted, but also provides a degree of assurance that the findings for 
OL’aNO when looking at the most frequently used word on each foundation are 
relatively robust. There is a comparison to be made to their fellow centrist-populist 
party ANO 2011 in that they avoid the nationalism which tends to characterise the 
approaches of the right-wing populist parties, although the overall focus on the family 

















Table 34: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for 
OL’aNO using the original MFD 
 









































































































Having completed the set of centrist populist parties with OL’aNO, it is now time to 
return to the right-wing populist parties with PiS. One would expect the Polish party 
to most closely resemble Fidesz in the style of communication it chooses, with the 
two parties the most similar in ideological terms amongst those studied according to 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2020). However, while the more minute 
level of analysis highlights a number of similarities, there are also some points of 
divergence. This is apparent from the start when considering the care foundation, 
which has a heavy focus on healthcare - a la Fidesz - but also mixes in references to 
safety and children. The fairness foundation is also somewhat different, with the 
main emphasis being on the notion of trust alongside references to the law, as well 
as some discussion of the concept of equality. Yet the loyalty foundation returns to 
the familiar pattern expected from a right-wing populist party, focusing almost evenly 
upon terms relating to the family and the nation, just as could be observed in the 
case of Fidesz. When considering that PiS was a governing party running for re-
election (Cienski and Wanat, 2019) it should also be no surprise that the authority 
foundation is based primarily around positions and power and the act of government, 
although there are also references to tradition and order. Finally, the sanctity 
foundation for PiS is one big outlier overall. Dignity is the main concept covered, with 
elements of religious discourse (“faith” and “sacred”), but it is somewhat unique 
amongst the case studies and merits further dissection. For PiS the overall picture is 
relatively clear, with the main emphasis being upon three areas: positions of power 
(related to experience of governing), families and the nation. This fits the profile one 
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would expect from a right-wing populist party with experience of governing, and is 
indeed relatively similar to the core tenets of Fidesz’s discourse when MFT is 
applied. 
 
Table 35: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for PiS 
using the MFD 2.0 
 








































































































For PiS, there are a small number of commonly used words which stand out as 
unusual when compared to the other parties studied. On the care foundation the 
word “safe” stands out as somewhat unique, being mainly used to refer to the 
concept of a safe Poland, comparable to its Western neighbours. Interestingly, 
despite the main area referenced on the care foundation for PiS being healthcare, 
there is little link between that and the concept of safety. The fairness foundation is 
also slightly unusual in the emphasis it puts on concepts of trust (“trust” and 
“trusted”) and equality (“equal”). For trust, PiS speaks of it as a two way process 
between themselves as a governing party and the Polish people, in an example of 
populist people-centred discourse (Ekström, Patrona and Thornborrow, 2018: 10). 
However, PiS discussion of equality is somewhat different to what would be 
expected of a left-wing or liberal party, focusing upon two main areas: equality of 
opportunity (through welfare), and equality within the European Union 
(predominantly with regards to payments to farmers through the Common 
Agricultural Policy). It is also a slight surprise to see PiS be the only party, 
particularly in the right-wing populist grouping, to have “tradition” score highly on the 
authority foundation. The term is used almost exclusively to refer to traditional values 
and ways of life, which would be expected by a party with the ideological profile of 
PiS, yet surprisingly was used sparingly by both Fidesz and the SDS. As previously 
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mentioned, the use of “dignity” as the most common word on the sanctity foundation 
is unusual, but it makes total sense when combined with the rest of the rhetoric used 
by PiS, often being adopted alongside tradition and values. It is also worth noting 
that the use of “waste” by PiS is not to denote waste being produced, but rather time 
being wasted, a semantic difference that likely lessens the effect of the word use in 
MFT terms. 
 
The effect of the use of the original MFD instead of the MFD 2.0 for PiS varies 
across the foundations. On the care foundation the headline result remains the 
same, with the most commonly used word remaining “care”. While the removal of 
“health” and “child” from the MFD has an effect on the most commonly used words, 
overall the general theme remains the same, being that of caring and protection, 
although “fight” is given greater sway. Similarly, once the words “trust” and “law” are 
removed by the switch of MFD the most commonly used words on the fairness 
foundation remain relatively similar to those observed using the MFD 2.0, with 
equality and justice key issues - suggesting that the outlier value for the virtue score 
on the fairness foundation is accurate. The loyalty foundation remains heavily 
focused upon concepts of family and nation, in keeping with the ideological profile of 
PiS and fitting with what was observed for Fidesz previously. However, the authority 
foundation is an area of significant change, with “class” the most frequently used 
word - a term not used in the MFD 2.0. This is somewhat surprising, but represents 
the tendency for PiS to discuss itself as a party of the middle class, as well as 
occasional references to wishing for Poland to no longer be considered second-class 
in a European context. The removal of “Prime Minister” and “President” also 
contribute to a sense of change when considering the results for the foundation, but 
overall the focus on tradition and societal hierarchy can still be seen. Finally, it is 
once again difficult to discern anything meaningful from the sanctity foundation due 
to the small sample size, as was the case for OL’aNO. In totality, the findings for PiS 
using the original MFD are relatively similar to those using the MFD 2.0, with the 
focus being upon families, social hierarchy, nationalism and care, even if the exact 




















Table 36: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for PiS 
using the original MFD 
 






































































































Party-by-Party Analysis: SDS 
 
The final party to be analysed in more depth is the SDS. The Slovenian party 
belongs to the same party family as Fidesz and PiS (being a right-wing populist 
party), and as such could be reasonably expected to use similar words in MFT terms 
to those parties. However as was shown in the previous section considering the 
language used by PiS in their communications, there is no guarantee of this being 
the case, particularly as on a number of the areas covered in the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey the SDS could be considered to be the most mainstream member of their 
party grouping (Bakker et al., 2020). Looking firstly at the care foundation, there is a 
clear linkage to Fidesz and PiS in the language used by the SDS, with the main 
focus being on healthcare - alongside some limited references to children. The 
fairness foundation for the SDS also draws upon similar concepts to Fidesz and PiS, 
being predominantly based around notions of the law and rights, with some 
reference also to the concept of trust. For the loyalty foundation, the clearer parallel 
can be drawn with Fidesz rather than PiS, with the main focus being on “country” 
and “countries”, as well as references to family. Interestingly, the fourth highest 
scorer on the authority foundation for the SDS is “companies”, a result more in line 
with the findings for ANO 2011 and GERB than their fellow populist right-wing 
parties. The authority foundation for the SDS is heavily based upon concepts of law 
and order, more so than in either of the cases of Fidesz and PiS, although the most 
commonly referred to term is “president”, which is in keeping with what has been 
observed in the majority of the parties studied across the two groups. However, the 
biggest outlier compared to all of the other parties studied comes on the sanctity 
55 
 
foundation. While frequent mentions of topics relating to corruption and faith are not 
unusual on this foundation, there are significant scores for a number of unexpected 
terms which merit further consideration - the word “food” chief among them. Overall, 
the main areas of reference for the SDS are country, law and health, although in 
individual terms it is “president” and the accompanying concept of leadership which 
stands out as the most commonly used word in the framework of MFT. 
 
Table 37: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for the 
SDS using the MFD 2.0 
 












































































































As previously mentioned, the SDS have some peculiarities regarding their word 
usage, particularly on the sanctity foundation. However, the first notable outlier 
comes on the authority foundation with the use of “illegal”, a term that was not used 
particularly often by the other parties studied. For the SDS, references to illegality 
are focused mainly on the topic of illegal migration, with some limited references to 
more general illegality. This is unsurprising considering the party has sought to make 
political capital out of the refugee crisis, with Slovenia’s border consisting largely of 
the external Schengen border and therefore the country becoming a key transit route 
(Dockery, 2018). Beyond “illegal”, the other frequently used words which seem to be 
specific to the SDS are all found on the sanctity foundation as previously highlighted. 
The first of these words to be analysed further is “food”, which is the most frequently 
used word on the foundation and yet one for which a high score was completely 
unexpected. It is notable that the SDS discuss food in a variety of ways in their 
communication, cutting across multiple themes including agriculture, healthy living, 
and the provision of essential services. However, it is difficult to note any particular 
emotive appeal surrounding the use of the word “food” in the communication of the 
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SDS. The frequency with which the word “gross” is used is also slightly misleading, 
as in all but one of the cases it is used to refer to gross salaries, pensions or 
amounts, only once referring to a “gross insult”. Additionally, the same can be said 
for the uses of the word “body”, which rather than referring to the human body (as 
would be intended when discussing sanctity) it is instead only used to refer to 
governmental bodies. Therefore while the sanctity foundation for the SDS looks to 
have a slightly obscure list of most commonly used words, closer examination shows 
that this is a case of dual meanings presenting a problem. 
 
Looking at the word usage of the SDS on the basis of the original MFD, a clearer 
pattern less complicated by outliers and dual meanings is presented. Firstly, on the 
care foundation the overall emphasis remains on the word “care” itself, in keeping 
with the strong focus on healthcare identified when using the MFD 2.0. The care 
foundation is also characterised by a positive overall outlook for the SDS when using 
the original MFD, with words such as “peace” and “safe” being frequently used. 
Similarly, on the fairness foundation the emphasis remains on the concept of the law 
despite the word “law” itself switching to the authority foundation, with “justice” the 
most commonly used word. General notions of equality and fairness are also 
frequently seen, ideals that fit well with the expected right-wing populist party 
discourse. The combination of nationalism and focusing on families on the loyalty 
foundation is apparent, as it was for PiS and Fidesz, showcasing an area of 
commonality for the right-wing populist parties that is perhaps not felt as acutely for 
the centrist populist parties. As previously mentioned, “law” moves to the authority 
foundation when the original MFD is used, and in the case of the SDS becomes the 
most frequently used term as part of a general focus on law and order as part of their 
discussion through the prism of this foundation. The only outlier for the SDS when 
compared to the other two parties in the right-wing populist grouping comes through 
the word usage on the sanctity foundation, where the focus remains on notions of 
disease rather than any evocative religious imagery, with the most commonly used 
term being somewhat misleading as discussed previously (“gross”). However, overall 
the most commonly used words in MFT terms for the SDS fit near perfectly into the 
established pattern for right-wing populist parties, focusing upon nationalism, law 


















Table 38: Most commonly used words on each foundation and overall for the 
SDS using the original MFD 
 







































































































To conclude this section, it is worth summarising the common themes that emerge 
from the analysis of the most commonly used words by the parties studied on each 
of the foundations. Firstly, there will be discussion of the common themes emerging 
when the MFD 2.0 is used across the party groupings, before the same exercise is 
conducted using the results from the analysis conducted using the original MFD. 
Once the themes emerging through the use of each of the MFDs in isolation has 
been discussed, there will then be a summary discussion about the most common 
themes emerging in terms of word usage across the two MFDs used, as well as how 
they fit with the expected areas of commonality based upon non-MFT analyses of 
centrist-populist and right-wing populist parties, as well as populist parties more 
generally. 
 
Using the MFD 2.0, there are a number of universal themes that emerge for all of the 
parties studied in terms of the words they most commonly use. Working through the 
foundations in order, the first to note is regarding the care foundation. As identified in 
the party-by-party analysis conducted, the topic of healthcare is given great 
importance by almost all of the parties studied, with OL’aNO the only real exception. 
This is of course unsurprising, as healthcare is a topic that would be expected to 
come to the fore in any electoral campaign, but it shows how the populist parties are 
not simply a crude caricature, caring only for popular, anti-system and anti-
establishment forces. The same is true to an extent for the finding for the fairness 
foundation, with all of the six parties studied focusing mainly upon the concepts of 
law, justice and rights. However, references to equality while present do not score as 
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highly, a finding that could be argued to be in keeping with what would be expected 
of parties on the right of the political spectrum, although a different pattern can be 
found when the original MFD is used (as we will be discussed in this section). The 
loyalty foundation is characterised for all of the parties studied by frequent 
references to the notion of the country, in keeping with the expectation that 
nationalism would play a role in the rhetoric of the parties studied, though it does 
vary in importance from party to party. As with the care foundation, the authority 
foundation also sees OL’aNO as a slight outlier, with the emphasis of the other 
parties being predominantly upon positions of power. This may be due to the small 
sample size, but can also be explained by context, with OL’aNO a young party that 
had not previously entered government (Brunnerová, 2019: 107), unlike the others 
studied. Finally, there are no universal themes which emerge for the parties studied 
on the sanctity foundation using the MFD 2.0. 
 
In terms of the commonalities between the parties within the same groupings, it is 
clear that at least when using the MFD 2.0 there are a greater degree of shared traits 
between the right-wing populist parties than there are between the centrist populist 
parties. The latter grouping only displays a common theme on the loyalty foundation, 
that of togetherness, although the frequency with which companies and the notion of 
business are mentioned on the same foundation is comparable for ANO 2011 and 
GERB, with OL’aNO once again proving an outlier. However, the right-wing populist 
parties have far much more in common when their word use is studied across the 
foundations. On the care foundation both Fidesz and PiS make frequent references 
to fighting and the need to fight, although it should be noted this is much less 
common in the discourse used by the SDS. The loyalty foundation for all three 
parties in the grouping is characterised by a strong focus on the twin themes of 
family and country, as one would expect of right-wing populist parties, and the same 
is true of the heavy emphasis all three place on terms related to order on the 
authority foundation. There is also a shared tendency to discuss the sanctity 
foundation in terms of religion, with this characteristic particularly pronounced in the 
case of Fidesz. Unsurprisingly, this all leads to the overall themes for the three 
parties being relatively similar, with the most commonly used words scored by the 
MFD 2.0 referring primarily to terms related to nationalism, as well as emphasising 
positions of power. The former is to be expected and fits the typology one would 
expect from right-wing populist parties, basing their appeal around nationalism and 
nativism (Mudde, 2007: 28), while the latter fits well with the specific cases studied. 
Fidesz, PiS and the SDS are all parties which are constructed around a strong 
leader, who in effect uses them as their own personal electoral vehicles (Metz and 
Oross, 2020: 146-147; Stanley, 2020: 180; Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2019: 156). 
Therefore, it is to be expected that in their communications they are likely to 
emphasise those individuals (Viktor Orban, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Janez Jansa) as 
well as the positions of power that they hold, as part of their appeal to voters. 
 
Switching to the original MFD, there are a mixture of patterns that can be spotted 
when considering the words most frequently used by the parties studied, some 
consistent with the observations using the MFD 2.0, and some very different. 
Looking at the universal themes that can be seen in the data, the common theme for 
the care foundation is care itself, which acts in effect as a proxy for healthcare due to 
the absence of the directly related words for that theme (“health”, “healthy”, 
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“healthcare” etc) from the original MFD. The concept of fighting is also given greater 
significance by all of the parties studied, although it is not as consistently important 
for them as the theme of care is. On the fairness foundation there is once again an 
example of switching between related concepts as the scope of the MFD changes, 
with the concept of justice highly important to all of the parties studied, on a 
foundation which was dominated by law and related terms using the MFD 2.0. 
Instead, it is the authority foundation which plays that role when the original MFD is 
used, with the focus for all of the parties being upon concepts of law and order. 
However, unlike the MFD 2.0 the original MFD results in a pattern of words relating 
to cleanliness being visible across the most common words used by all of the parties 
on the sanctity foundation. The words used are relatively generic however, and 
therefore discerning any further meaning from the word choice on the sanctity 
foundation is near impossible, particularly with the issues around small sample 
sizes.  
 
Following on from the universal themes, there are also themes that are visible for the 
specific party groupings – reflecting the results when the MFD 2.0 was used. Firstly, 
for the centrist populist parties there is the relatively high usage of the notion of 
protection on the care foundation. However, as previously noted this may in fact be a 
false friend, with references to data protection being counted as part of the scoring 
on the care foundation, even if due to the context in which they are placed they are 
unlikely to have much effect – if any – in terms of making an emotional appeal to the 
reader. However, on the loyalty foundation the frequent references to togetherness 
continue for the centrist populist parties, suggesting a more positive and inclusionary 
approach to the ingroup/outgroup divide than is likely to be found for the right-wing 
populist parties, in keeping with expectations that the latter group would be more 
likely to invoke the “them” and “us” divide (Mudde, 2019a). For the right-wing populist 
parties the first area of common ground when the original MFD is used can be found 
on the fairness foundation, with the concept of equality frequently referenced by the 
three parties in the grouping. This could potentially be linked to the tendency for 
right-wing populist parties to adopt traditionally left-wing welfare policies aimed at 
voters from less wealthy socio-economic backgrounds (Afonso, 2015: 288), and is 
an example of how the populist-right differs from traditional conservatives, who 
would be less likely to focus their energies on discussing equality. Similar to the 
findings when the MFD 2.0 is used, on the loyalty foundation the right-wing populist 
parties mainly use words referring to the nation and the family, in keeping with the 
established ideological and discursive priors for the party family (Mudde, 2019a; 
Mudde, 2019b). Another area where Fidesz, PiS and the SDS conform with 
expectations is on the authority foundation, with a vague notion of hierarchy running 
throughout the most common words used by each of the parties. However, this 
finding is of limited significance as it is unclear whether all the parties are reinforcing 
hierarchies (as would be expected from traditional conservative parties) or criticising 
them from their word usage alone. Overall, the established pattern continues for the 
right-wing populist parties as the most commonly used words scored on the MFD for 
them are focused upon the clear themes of family and nation, core building blocks of 
their ideological profiles.  
 
Having considered the findings regarding the most commonly used words on each of 
the foundations with both the MFD 2.0 and the original MFD across the two party 
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groupings, there are a number of areas of commonality which should be the main 
takeaways from this analysis. In terms of universal themes across the parties 
studied, there are three which stand out across the two different MFDs used. The 
first is regarding the care foundation, which is characterised by a high degree of 
importance being given to the concept of healthcare (and care more generally) by all 
of the parties studied. Secondly, for all of the parties studied there is a common 
theme irrespective of the version of the MFD used regarding the focus on justice and 
associated words on the fairness foundation. This is linked to the third and final 
universal theme identified by analysis of the party communications, regarding the 
high frequency with which law and related concepts are referred to by all of the 
parties studied. This is true regardless of which version of the MFD is used, however 
it is worth noting that the effect is not immediately apparent when comparing them 
side-by-side, as “law” and related terms are found on the fairness foundation when 
using the MFD 2.0, and on the authority foundation when using the original MFD.  
 
There are also areas of commonality across the two MFDs used for both the centrist 
populist and the right-wing populist party groupings. Interestingly, the key 
commonalities are mainly focused on one foundation – the loyalty foundation – 
where the two groupings prescribe high levels of importance to two very distinct sets 
of themes. For the centrist populist parties, the shared theme running through the 
most commonly used words on the loyalty foundation is togetherness, usually 
indicated by the usage of the word “together” itself. This is in stark contrast to the two 
areas of commonality identified on the same foundation for the right-wing populist 
parties, which instead focus upon the twin themes of family and nation. There is a 
potential explanation for this phenomena in the respective ideological positioning of 
the two groupings. While the centrist populist parties studied are all considered to be 
right-of-centre (largely due to their economic positioning and varying degrees of 
social conservatism), their centrist nature would suggest a desire to be seen as 
somewhat of a “catch-all” party (Engler, 2020: 320-321). Such an approach would 
put a heavy emphasis on coalition-building and being seen as welcoming and 
inclusive to middle-ground voters. In contrast, the right-wing populist parties are 
likely to have built their ideological appeals around appealing to nativism and social 
conservatism, and as such a strong emphasis to voters about the importance of the 
nation and the family is to be expected (Mudde, 2019a; Mudde, 2019b). Indeed, the 
third area of commonality identified is linked to this, with it noted that the most 
commonly used words overall by the right-wing populist parties as scored by the two 
MFDs are focused upon the topics of nation and family, suggesting that they rely 
heavily upon aspects of the loyalty foundation in their discourse – building on the 
ingroup/outgroup divide as part of their political strategies. As such, it could be 
suggested that a feeling of belonging is more important to supporters of right-of-
centre populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe than any particular ideational 
theme. While the precise parameters dividing the ingroup from the outgroup differ for 
the two party groupings, the same phenomenon can be observed, with supporters 
prioritising being on what they perceive as “the right side” over coherent ideology. 
 
An unexpected trend was identified in the original analysis when considering the 
sanctity foundation, with the centrist populist party grouping scoring higher on 
average than the right-wing populist party grouping regardless of which version of 
the MFD was used. Considering that the expectation based upon previous research 
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using Moral Foundations Theory was that the score for the sanctity foundation would 
increase as the parties being studied moved rightwards across the political 
spectrum, this is a finding that merits further scrutiny. As previously noted in this 
section of the analysis, there is a limited degree of comparability between the parties 
studied in terms of word usage for the sanctity foundation, but a closer study reveals 
general trends which may go some way to explaining the unexpected results. 
 
When the MFD 2.0 is used, it is possible to identify a pattern in terms of the nature of 
the words primarily used by the respective groupings. For the right-wing populist 
parties, the primary word usage for the virtue aspect of the sanctity foundation is 
primarily focused around notions of faith, while the vice aspect of the foundation is 
instead focussed mainly upon corruption, particularly when false friends such as 
“gross” are accounted for. In contrast, the centrist populist parties tend to have a 
broader range of word usage for the sanctity foundation, with less of a focus on 
religion (though it remains present as a key topic), and more of a focus on matters of 
cleanliness and health. This broader palate, as it were, may explain why the score 
for the sanctity foundation is unexpectedly higher for the centrist populist parties, 
particularly considering the design of the research and the false friends discussed in 
the previous section. A very similar pattern can be identified when the original MFD 
is used, which suggests that it is the key underlying factor creating the difference in 
the scores on the sanctity foundation.  
 
Therefore the results for the sanctity foundation should be taken with caution - it 
cannot be stated that centrist populist parties utilise the sanctity foundation more in 
their communication with certainty, but it also cannot be stated that the opposite is 
true as per the original hypothesis before the research was conducted. The wide 
variety of words ascribed to the foundation in both the original MFD and the MFD 2.0 
have an unintended effect when utilising the MFDs for textual analysis of this nature, 
as the “scores” generated are not the result of repeated references to common 
themes (as identified on other foundations), but rather a collection of a large number 
of less common words and phrases. The “broader palate” explanation as highlighted 
above may explain the unexpected deviation from the expected results in this case, 






Moral Foundations Theory provides a useful lens through which to study party 
communication, but in the case of populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe it 
has proven to have limitations. It was possible to ascertain some of the expected 
findings of the research, namely that right-wing populist parties combine high scores 
on the loyalty and authority foundations with slightly higher than expected scores on 
the care foundation (though the scores for the fairness and sanctity foundations 
confounded expectations) when party communications are analysed using the MFD 
2.0 and the original MFD. The secondary hypothesis regarding the degree of 
deviation expected to be observed when comparing the parties studied to traditional 
conservative parties was also proven to be lacking in validity for both party 
groupings. A weak effect in support of the view that the right-wing populist grouping 
would show more deviation than the centrist populist grouping was evident when the 
MFD 2.0 was used, but the use of the original MFD resulted in the trend pointing in 
the opposite direction. Therefore the lack of consistency across the two MFDs 
combined with the continued outlier case of the sanctity foundation combined to 
make verification of the secondary hypothesis impossible. 
 
Despite the previously observed challenges, the use of Moral Foundations Theory in 
this context still provided a number of useful findings. After switching focuses from 
the macro level to the micro level and looking at word usage, it was possible to 
identify trends in communication patterns across the different moral foundations for 
the two party groupings studied. From this micro-level analysis of the most 
commonly used words on each of the foundations by the six parties studied it is 
possible to create thematic “pen-portraits” for both the right-wing populist and centrist 
populist groupings, as well as right-of-centre populists in the region more generally. 
While this was not the original aim of the research, it is nonetheless valuable new 
knowledge which has been generated and which contributes to existing scholarship 
regarding populism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Centrist populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe have a relatively diverse 
range of themes in their communication, at least from the perspective of Moral 
Foundations Theory. Healthcare is a common theme for these parties and dominates 
their communication in terms of the care foundation, as well as references to fighting 
for better results. The concepts of justice and a strong commitment to the law are the 
main themes they draw upon when discussing concepts contained within the 
fairness foundation. When discussing the loyalty foundation they primarily concern 
themselves with notions of togetherness, rather than discussing more exclusionary 
positions. In terms of the authority foundation they display a rigid commitment to law 
and order, but they lack a strong consistent theme for the sanctity foundation. As a 
result they are typified by a relatively traditional conservative approach focusing 
upon law, order and justice combined with elements of a more centrist, “big-tent” 
approach which seeks to build voter coalitions around relatively generic mainstream 
issues such as healthcare. 
 
Right-wing populist parties, as expected, have a great degree in common with the 
centrist populist parties of the region when considering the themes present in their 
communication. They too focus heavily upon healthcare (care), justice (fairness), law 
63 
 
(fairness/authority) and order (authority), but they also bring in other distinct themes 
which mark them out as a separate grouping. In the framework of the fairness 
foundation they tend to discuss equality more frequently than the centrist populist 
parties, and when they discuss loyalty their focus is upon the twin concepts of family 
and nation. They are more likely to invoke notions of hierarchy in their 
communications when they invoke the loyalty foundation, and they often couch their 
usage of the sanctity foundation in terms of references to religion and associated 
language. Therefore while the standard template for a populist party in Central and 
Eastern Europe seems to apply to them (a focus on healthcare, law, order and 
justice) they do not adopt the elements of the big-tent approach observed in the 
communication of the centrist populist parties. Instead they remain more traditionally 
conservative, building their appeal around notions of family, nation, hierarchy and 
religion, while also speaking more about equality than would be expected from 
mainstream conservative parties. 
 
Therefore, while the use of Moral Foundations Theory was not able to entirely 
reproduce the findings expected at the start of the research, it still proved an 
invaluable tool for analysing the communications of the parties studied and therefore 
how they seek to appeal to the moral intuitions of their voters. It should be noted that 
the majority of the findings of the research were in line with expectations, and those 
unexpected findings can be understood by the limitations of Moral Foundations 
Theory in this context. The variety of the words included on each of the foundations 
(and particularly the sanctity foundation) mean that when conducting research of this 
nature it is not always possible to accurately ascertain “scores” on each of the 
foundations. What may appear to be a higher score for a certain party grouping on a 
certain foundation (e.g. the centrist populist grouping on the sanctity foundation) may 
not be entirely as it appears, especially when a common theme cannot be identified 
in the words used on that foundation. In this regard, there is a potential issue with the 
use of the MFDs for textual analysis when a “broader palate” is adopted for a specific 
foundation – that is to say, no coherent common theme emerges in terms of word 
usage, but a large number of unrelated scoring words are present (the issue for the 
sanctity foundation in this case).  
 
Further research using the theory in the context of populism in Central and Eastern 
Europe ought to focus on two particular aspects: understanding voter motivations 
through analyses of survey responses and physical campaign materials, and 
developing a greater understanding of how domestic political contexts shape scores 
on each of the foundations. Research into the former would prove valuable for 
validating the findings of this study, while further enquiry into the latter may help to 
clarify the outliers observed during this research, particularly around the sanctity 
foundation. It would also be worthwhile to replicate this study for those parties where 
the available sample size was smaller than was ideal (mainly OL’aNO and ANO 
2011, plus PiS to an extent) using other material - for example manifestos or 
speeches from party leaders - in order to check if the sample size effect had a 
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